AMERICA’S INTERVENTION IN THE BALKANS

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Foreword

Ronald Hatchett

Many nations operate with hidden agendas in the international arena. American foreign policy under the Administration of President Bill Clinton has taken this concept to the extreme. According to Mr. Clinton and his administrators, American policy in the post-Cold War world is focused on expanding the community of free enterprise-based democracies and ensuring fundamental human rights for all peoples. Moreover, American foreign policy efforts are supposedly guided by rule of law, respect for global norms and the sovereign equality of states, not by great power hegemonism.

There is a yawning gap, however, between the avowed objectives of American foreign policy and its actual implementation by the Clinton diplomatic team. Nowhere is this discrepancy more apparent than in the declared and actual American policy towards the Balkans. The declared policy is packaged as a commitment to the principles of national self-determination, respect for the sovereignty of states however small, promotion of peace and harmony amongst the peoples of the region, adherence to international law, and, above all, upholding morality in international relations.

The image projected by the Clinton Administration is that of America assisting - for instance - a small, independent nation, called Bosnia, whose peoples are struggling to escape military conquest by an aggressive Yugoslav state dominated by the notoriously warlike Serbs, and led by an anachronistic, neocommunist, authoritarian regime. Analogies have been drawn with conditions leading to World Wars I and II. We are reminded that “Sarajevo” sparked the conflagration of 1914; and that “Munich 1938” led to another world war a year later. The implication thus suggested is that America must act to save the world from the resurgence of such catastrophes. The Clinton team has also added the myth that “the Europeans” are unable to resolve the Balkan problems without American leadership.

For the most part, the American press has accepted Clinton’s declared policy at face value. The media has reinforced the policy-makers’ images and myths with countless articles of their own, seemingly competing with each other in raising the level of sensationalism through selective reporting. The continuing story of the brave, beleaguered Bosnian people, committed to democracy, free enterprise and a multicultural society, struggling against the power of the authoritarian, aggressive, socialist Serbs is a great American epic in the Horatio Alger tradition. It provides a moral high ground for U.S. government actions in the Balkans and it sells newspapers and raises the television ratings.
As anyone familiar with the real situation underlying the problems of the Balkans is well aware, all of the above is pure bunk! It is what those in the inner governing circle call “public diplomacy” when directed towards the American people, and “political theater” when directed towards governments of other nations. If another country was the source of such rhetoric we would call it simply, and accurately, “propaganda.”

One need only pick at a few loose ends in the declared American policy towards the Balkans to unravel the whole fabric. For example, if America was so deeply committed to the concept of a “multicultural” state in the Balkans, why did it so readily condone the dismembering of Yugoslavia? If America was determined to see international law prevail in the modern world, why did it not insist on negotiations amongst the citizens of Yugoslavia to determine the terms of dissolution, as provided for under international law, and as was done in the case of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia?

If it prizes rule of law, why did America renege on its obligations under the U.N. Charter, and its agreement under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 “to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all member states” - including Yugoslavia, a founding member of both institutions? If America places the right of self determination of peoples above the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, why does it apply these principles to Slovenes, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Skopje-Macedonians, but not to Serbs? If the reunification of the Germans into a single country - after decades of living in two separate sovereign states - is to be celebrated, why is the desire of Serbs to come together into a single country - after even more decades of living in separate provinces of the same country - such a crime against humanity and a threat to world peace?

If the Balkan problem stemmed from the aggression of an authoritarian, communist dominated Serbia, why has America now made the Serbian communist leader, Slobodan Milosevic, its ally in structuring political arrangements in the Balkans to American liking? If America really wanted the Europeans to solve the Balkan problems themselves, why did it block the 1992 Lisbon Plan brokered by the European Union (EU), which could have avoided conflict in Bosnia even before the first shot was fired in Sarajevo? Why did it undermine several subsequent EU-UN initiatives, such as the Vance-Owen Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, which would have ended the bloodshed?

And finally, if America truly wants to retire from the area and leave the peoples of the region free to live together in peace, why is it promoting the intrusion of Muslim factions into Serb and Croat areas of Bosnia, why is it continuously arming the Muslim faction with high technology weaponry not found in the arsenals of any of the other factions, and why is it sending the best leaders of the American military to train Muslim forces and help them plan military operations?
Obviously the declared reasons for American policy towards the Balkans are not the actual reasons guiding its policy. This book offers the ideas of several informed American foreign policy and Balkan specialist about the true American agenda in the Balkans. A variety of views are presented. They all have in common the theme that *American actions in the Balkans are not guided by the high moral principles of its declared policy, but rather the pragmatic self interests of a great power struggling to hold on to and expand its power base vis-a-vis potential rivals.* Russia is one obvious target, but so too is the European Union, which already has eclipsed the United States in overall economic strength.

The Clinton administration is clinging to the outmoded idea that promoting American interests requires continuation of geopolitical maneuvering in a zero sum game in which for America to win, someone must lose. So the Clinton government is willing to sacrifice the rights and aspirations of small nationality groups like the Serbs and risk alienating important nations of Europe for what it perceives to be more important geopolitical goals, such as:

- strengthening ties with the Billion-plus Muslims of the world;
- giving new purpose to NATO, a moribund relic of the Cold War which it hopes will be the vehicle for continuing American “leadership” in Europe, and
- acquiring new strategic bases from which to oppose any “resurgence” of Russia and to oversee the flow of oil from newly developing fields in the Caspian region.

As an American I am concerned that this policy is shortsighted; that it is suited only for the world that was, not the world that is and will be. The key to changing this policy is for Americans to become educated about the true facts of what our government is *actually doing* in southeast Europe, not what the administration declares it is doing. This book is an excellent first step in the learning process.

“You will come to know the truth and the truth shall set you free.” (John, 8:32)
INTRODUCTION

What is Good for America…

Sir Alfred Sherman
Chairman, The Lord Byron Foundation

The war in Bosnia was America’s war in every sense of the word. The United States administration helped start it, kept it going, and prevented its early end. Indeed, all indications are that it intends to allow the war to continue in the near future, as soon as its Muslim protégés are fully armed and trained. How it did so is common knowledge. Why it did so, and the implications for American defense and foreign policy generally remain to be elucidated. This book, based on the papers presented at an international conference organized and cosponsored by The Lord Byron Foundation and Chronicles in Chicago in March 1997, seeks to provide some tentative answers.

The facts of the case are clear enough. In 1991, the breakup of Yugoslavia, abetted by a reunified Germany newly dominant in the European Union, led to conflict in Croatia and brought the future of Bosnia onto the agenda. It had become clear that whereas a united secular Bosnia was feasible within Yugoslavia—any Yugoslavia—its perpetuation as a sovereign state created serious difficulties. A strong current of Muslim opinion led by Alija Izetbegovic desired to restore the status quo ante 1878, when Bosnia was an Ottoman province ruled by the Sheriyat, with its Christian majority in subjection and subordination.

Not even Izetbegovic’s professional apologists in the West deny that under Yugoslavia the Muslims of Bosnia were accorded civil and political rights equal to, or better than, those enjoyed by other nations in the federation. But this situation was inherently unacceptable to committed Muslims, for whom Islamic rule independent of infidel power was a religious prerequisite. This view was openly espoused in their own publications during the period of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, notably in the periodical Islamska Misao and in Izetbegovic’s Islamic Declaration, though bien pensants are as reluctant to take it seriously as an expression of intent as their predecessors were loath to take Mein Kampf seriously.

At the outset of the present crisis, most inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not want to become “Bosnians” in any political sense. The Croats, concentrated in western Herzegovina, sought secession from Yugoslavia in order to facilitate their union with an enlarged Croatia. The Serbs, for their part, wanted to remain linked to their brethren east...
of the Drina river, having suffered for centuries under alien misrule, including the clerico-fascist Ustasa regime, which in 1941-1945 perpetrated genocide against the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia with active Muslim participation.

At all events, the European Union, having contributed to the breakup of Yugoslavia at German prompting which unleashed war in Croatia, sought to prevent the same thing happening in Bosnia. Lord Carrington, one-time British foreign secretary and Secretary General of NATO, was chairman of this endeavor. Carrington’s task of damage limitation was made all the more difficult when Izetbegovic, a militant fundamentalist, declared that the independence of Bosnia was a great event, second in his Muslim calendar only to 1453—the year of the fall of Constantinople. But Lord Carrington, who had fought through World War II and regarded wars as worth avoiding, was able—by inspired chairmanship—to broker an agreement, initialed in early 1992 in Lisbon by leaders of the three delegations—Serb, Croat, and Muslim—who returned to their respective strongholds committed to seeking ratification from their assemblies.

It was then that America acted fatefully. For reasons which remain to be adduced acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger—who knew Yugoslavia well from his term as Ambassador there and as banker subsequently—instructed Warren Zimmerman, the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade, to fly posthaste to Sarajevo to persuade Izetbegovic to renege on the agreement. The Muslim leader was promised all political, diplomatic, and military aid if he agreed to do so. Izetbegovic needed little persuasion. He duly reneged on the agreement and appealed for support in the Muslim world; the Bosnian war began. It has yet really to end. As in Greek tragedy, one action by a protagonist, Eagleburger, set a train of events irrevocably in motion.

During the years that followed, America pulled the strings from the background, encouraging, aiding, and abetting the Muslims. Washington kept pressing EU members, like Britain and France, which had serious misgivings to accept its faits accomplis. Russia was forced to toe the line under the most inept administration it has ever had. The U.S. encouraged and facilitated the dispatch of arms to the Muslims via Iran and Eastern Europe—a fact which was denied in Washington at the time in the face of overwhelming evidence. America used NATO and UNPROFOR as its policy instruments, and blocked all peace moves, of which there were several between 1992 and 1995. Then, having effectively prevented the Europeans from reaching agreement, the United States was able to corral them into a military offensive in the summer of 1995, sparked off by staged incidents reminiscent of the battleship Maine and the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

But why? Here we have the most powerful country on earth at the present time deeply involved in Balkan affairs (which bear absolutely no relationship to American security), extending its power into Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and involving itself deeply in a number of long-standing and perhaps incurable national conflicts, between
Serbs and Croats, Christians and Muslims, Slav Macedonians and Greeks, Slovaks and Hungarians, Hungarians and Romanians, Romanians and Ukrainians…

The enlargement of NATO, at a time when Europe is as peaceful as it has ever been, entails the militarization of foreign policy, the very antithesis of the American tradition in international relations. Madeleine Albright, speaking as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, stated unequivocally that the U.S. policy in Bosnia was “the foundation of its policies for Europe.” We need to pause and think of the implications: lying and cheating, fomenting war in which civilians are the main casualty and in which ancient hatreds feed on themselves, involving America in a maelstrom easier to enter than to leave, and above all risking long-term conflict with a Russia which is only partly removed from its recent imperialist past.

One can understand the principle of U.S. involvement in Cuba, Guatemala, or Haiti, even if one does not necessarily approve of particular policies. America is of necessity involved in hemispheric affairs, and it has traditionally been involved in “North Atlantic,” i.e., European, affairs, to the extent of two world wars and the Cold War. But what is the relevance of the Balkans and the Black Sea? And what is the point of creating and arming a militantly Muslim polity in the Balkans which ineluctably gives Iran a foothold there and a route into Central and Western Europe for subversion and terror?

An attempt will be made in these pages to examine “rational” and “ideological” reasons for doing so. The U.S. has traditionally worked with some ugly despotisms, and is still doing so, viz. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Pakistan. But to intervene in favor of Islamic fundamentalism, to help expel Serbs from land they have inhabited as majorities for centuries, and to adopt the German-encouraged drive to reverse what is left of the Versailles provisions does not make sense.

Why then? I go back to the Spanish-American war as an analogy. The United States, with the Civil War and Reconstruction behind it, wanted to flex its muscles and created its “Manifest Destiny.” The remnants of the Spanish Empire in Cuba, the Philippines, and the Pacific were no conceivable threat to the United States, but they were an easy target. Cuba’s subsequent ills, leading to Castro’s dictatorship (which generated the greatest threat to America in its history), were a result of U.S. aggression which left Cuba with an independence which it had not sought and for which it was unprepared. Filipinos were unable to adopt American mores, and still live in a miasma of corruption and violence. Spain itself was convulsed by defeat, which stripped it of its last outposts. These convulsions lay at the basis of Spain’s unhappy twentieth century: the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the Republic it engendered, the military uprising, civil war, and the Franco dictatorship from which Spain is only now recovering.

The temptations of imperial arrogance are not new, even in the United States. They should not be forgotten just because America was, in some part, protected from this
arrogance by the genuine weight and burden, more imposed than chosen, of defending the free world against Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. The end of the Cold War has stripped off this protection. Yet the White House has chosen a Secretary of State who is a Cold War junkie, a connoisseur of confrontation, a woman living too passionately in the past, eager to seize the first opportunity to show how the old battles should have been fought, how the West should have won at Munich. Let us not be surprised if all the talk of leadership, resolve, firmness, and new interests is a preparation for war and the nomination of new enemies.

To present the United States as the world’s policeman, judge, and jury may or may not play well in campaign rhetoric, but the idea is endlessly seductive for the Washington community of foreign policy professionals—often poorly educated, high on excitement, and low in statesmanlike patience. They fear, quite irrationally, that the world will happily pass them by unless America imposes herself, “rises to the challenge,” and throws her weight about. Albright’s heroes are Truman and Marshall. She makes it clear they are also her models. But where is her U.S.S.R.? The foreign policy community wants the feel-good factor, the winning-the-Cold-War glow, to go on and on. But to live for the adrenaline and glory of yesterday and yesteryear is to ride for a fall and to walk with hubris.

Can the yearning to be the world’s policeman be the basis of policy? In formal terms, perhaps not. But if the poison is at work, it may be detected. Clinton knows that he should always deny the charge. Throughout the Bosnian intervention, he was the respectable front-end of the Lake-Albright program. Inside the State Department and the CIA, there is always room for the pretense that policy is more limited and calculated than the passions and arrogance which may drive it. German policy before 1914 was also sometimes defined, on paper, by men more rational than those who took the initiatives and made the choices. Such draftsmen and spokesmen may be employed in Washington. But Mrs. Albright will wrestle with pragmatic formulas as Pilgrim wrestled with Sin.

The power and prestige of America is in the hands of people who will not resist the temptation to invent new missions, lay down new embargoes, and fabricate new courts. For the time being, they control the United Nations, the World Bank, most of the world’s high-tech weapons, and the vast majority of the satellites which watch us from every quadrant of the skies. This is the opportunity they sense, and we must ask what ambitions they will declare next.

The pursuit of world importance for the sake of world importance is the great temptation in human history, the path of ruin that winds from Xerxes, the Persian king of kings, to Hitler, the Austrian corporal-tyrant. It is the path which George Washington forbade America ever to take. The American people will never choose it, but can they prevent it? The American foreign policy elite is locking itself onto this path, and their coconspirators in the media corporations are calling it a pilgrimage. Bosnia was the acid
test. They knew why they should not go in; they knew the damage it would do to their oldest alliances; but they could not resist. The combination of high moral purpose, however trumped up by the media, and the chance to show Europe that “only America decides” was just too intoxicating.

At the time of this writing, America is uniquely powerful. It will not always be so. In the course of time, Russia may gain its potential strength, and there is very little the United States can do about Chinese developments one way or the other. It might save the Chinese Republic in Taiwan for better times, but that would require a great measure of commitment, which will be less likely if the Balkan war turns hot, and a flow of body bags begins.

A law of history is that power tends to generate countervailing power. We do not know how this will come about. We can do little more than guard against arrogance and overextension and minimize the pointless sacrifices they usually entail. The contributors to this volume should be proud to have taken part in this endeavor.
America in Bosnia: A Sign of Things to Come

Michael Stenton
Director of Studies, The Lord Byron Foundation

The present American inclination to support an Islamic microstate in Bosnia against the Serbs, and against the Croats of Herceg-Bosna, would have seemed far-fetched and improbable to most observers in 1991. It is just conceivable that the trend will not continue to its logical destination, but to count on its alteration would be foolish. The existing state of European confusion will, in effect, continue to encourage the Washington “janissaries”—their ranks swollen after Madeleine Albright’s appointment as Secretary of State—to push a strongly ideological policy in the name of “American leadership.”

Circumstances permitted Washington to obstruct an early settlement of the war in Bosnia in order to compel Europe to consent to the American use of force to end it. Those circumstances have not changed. Once it was clear that Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic was an American client, no one wanted to pay the price of criticizing his regime. If this inhibition continues to operate, as seems likely, one can expect the Muslim government in Sarajevo to carry out its threats some time during 1998. With American taxpayers’ money it is busy reequipping and training its army. When this is done it will attempt to destroy the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska). The janissary element in Washington is well disposed to this outcome and confident of media support in representing the destruction of the Dayton compromise as the enforcement of Dayton principles.

There is a tendency to speak of “Europe” as an entity which opposes this trend, which regrets the decision to arm the Muslims, and which wants the Dayton division of Bosnia to be the end of the story—apart from that necessary concession to State Department vanity, the “war crimes” coda. This pragmatic Europe does exist—in diplomatic circles, ministries of defense, and the minds of a few dissident journalists. It can be glimpsed in British and Italian statements; it can be deduced as a French preference; and it is what the Kremlin wants the Russian public to believe is Russian policy.

On the other hand, the Germans and Austrians have their own janissaries. Old-fashioned anti-Serb passion is stronger in the German-speaking Mitteleuropa than
anywhere else. German diplomats always wish to sound pragmatic, and their underlying commitment is to Croatia; but while the Bosnian Muslims retain American favor the German government is likely to block a strong European response to janissary tendencies in Washington. Bonn likes to inhabit whatever Washington defines as the high moral ground. American goodwill has been invaluable—more so than French, British, or Russian—as Germany quietly resumes its position as the chief military presence in Europe.

So far, so conventional. But these observations only state the surface problem. There is another Europe. I do not mean real public opinion, which is almost as unexcited about Bosnia as its American equivalent, but the mirage of strong opinion created by the Serbophobic media and accepted as real by the politicians. For the liberal elites in the capital cities of the European Union, the Bosnian Question remains an ideological knot which has neither been untied nor cut. The anti-Serb faction in Washington have their soulmates in London, Brussels, and Paris.

Balkan events of limited intrinsic importance have disclosed to Washington the weakness of European politics and how Europe can be lead. It was much harder in 1945. It is the ideological thrust of Serbophobia which is so important, because it helped weak European politicians to ignore professional advice and “go global,” just as in Washington it helped janissary professionals to override political (and Pentagon) doubts and remain uncompromising. With the partial exception of Germany, the key to diplomatic action about Bosnia is not national interest. The concept of such interests—American, British, French, Russian—cannot be used to track what has been happening.

Let us consider not interests but the concept of policy. Do modern states have policies? A political insider, a witness to the chaotic process of lobbying, fixing, and improvising may doubt it. Washington may seem to be a wholly nonstrategic environment where the careers of leading politicians and the money of the bigger lobbies interact unpredictably. British diplomats were lamenting even fifty years ago that it was almost impossible to get policies out of democratic politicians. If this was true in Churchill’s time, it was no less true in Thatcher’s. Margaret Thatcher could react to events energetically. However, she was no strategist, and she was pushed out of Downing Street precisely because she would not, probably dared not, work out a policy for Europe. Bill Clinton showed not the least relish for “Bosnia” when it kept crawling up his presidential agenda. (A true janissary might have overreached himself in 1992 and failed.) Nevertheless, appearances are deceptive. The institutional weight of the interventionists in 1993, as of Britain’s Europhiles in 1990, ensured that Clinton’s doubts, and Thatcher’s Euro-scepticism, did not obstruct their desired goals. Curious it may be, but policies do happen.

Policies are not formulated in the clean, crisp, and lucid way that a good bureaucrat would like, but they emerge and—by persisting—develop a strategic force. If
elected politicians do not think about strategy, they should not be surprised to find themselves acquiring it like a fungal infection. If the process is difficult to understand, it is because we tend to look for positive, intelligent motives and pay too little attention to rhetoric, ideology, and the manipulation of negatives. There is a postmodern media-centered political process that displaces both professional diplomacy and informed debate. By “negatives” I mean the ability to place others under pressure—not by doing something but by refusing consent to do something. (Hence the value of the United Nations, the World Bank, and OSCE—even the World Health Organization was used against the Serbs.)

America intervened in Bosnia by refusing so many things that it became indispensable. By “ideology” I mean high fashion in ideas about power and legitimacy: in this case, smart designer opinions supplied to the rich and educated. By “rhetoric” I mean the ability of two or three news agencies and a TV channel to define for hundreds of newspapers and TV channels both the terms of debate on a given issue and the relevant information.

We have a problem. We scan the skies for the black helicopters of world government while the U.N. Secretary General offers plausible denial. With goodwill and closed eyes you notice nothing; with suspicion and open eyes the dark choppers are everywhere. In March 1997, a few American and German troops turned up in Albania to jump and roll in front of the cameras and evacuate NATO nationals. The Germans, in self-defense, were shooting up local policemen. My TV was telling me that the international community had to intervene in Albania to prevent “anarchy” and a NATO spokesman in Brussels explained that NATO must have a “political framework” before it could act.

Where did this rhetoric come from? There is nothing obvious about it. Other words and other meanings were possible. It is evident that this “anarchy-intervention-political framework” story was planted knowingly and then diffused willingly. Once inserted in media discourse such a story exists; it displaces possible variants, and cannot in the normal course of events be remade, though it can be dropped. It is useful to call the planted story “rhetoric” because its function is both to indicate possible action and to exclude obvious questions.

This is the normal framework of modern politics. Globalism is not a conspiracy, it is a social system, a mentality, and an expanding wave of redefinitions. Formal legitimacy is becoming a side-issue. Functional legitimacy is redefined as less a matter of effective authority or even of ballot boxes than of conformity to globalist precepts. Rhetoric is not persuasion but the control of the media agenda. Ideology is the collective motivation (or the herd instinct) of Wealth. The points are familiar, the pattern is still under-recognized. European politics used to be different.
Only a decade ago Washington’s big-business liberalism was considered something of a joke by left and right alike. Europe was more social-democratic, more anti-immigration, more atavistic and national. It still is. Yet Western Europe since 1945 has been less un-American than commonly supposed, and it is getting even less so. It is striking that the immigration question—the great globalist signifier—was always handled, in practice, on strangely American assumptions despite the unfriendly national contexts. The power of globalist ideology to freeze the national capacity for action, even reaction, was there for all to see.

Wealth is, today, no longer hampered by the regional, Cold War constraints which kept Europe different before 1989. The isolationist right in America has long charged the liberal elite with being unpatriotic. In Europe the same argument is developing. The attack on the nation state is unrelenting and explicit. The more you resist, the bigger the siege engines used against you. The British attempt to be in Europe without capitulating to its institutions provokes a sort of cold fury from Euro-globalists and is regularly punished by the European Commission and Court.

The Swiss decision not to join “Europe” (actually, not the European Union but the regulated trade penumbra) was resented. Suddenly, Swiss banks have no protection as they face the wrath of Jewish families whose pre-war deposits they confiscated. Is it coincidental that the Swiss banks are now learning that they are vulnerable and exposed? Very well, let it be coincidence. But this much is safe ground: the just demand for repayment was, sadly, ignored from 1945-1995. Here we return to rhetoric. Somebody has passed a note to “Media Control” and presto, it’s an issue.

Wealth, of course, does not have a single interest, but that is like saying that investments are not all the same. Wealth seeks a favorable regime, reassurance, and ideological satisfaction. It does so in Europe as well as in America. This is less a post-Marxist accusation than a claim that, as the ideological purchase of nationalism has receded, the hyper-capitalist or globalist voice has grown stronger, and that as socialist internationalism has shriveled the internationalism of the investing class, hardened by a rediscovered sense of manifest destiny, is unconstrained and rampant. Nature abhors a vacuum. What is now facing us is the trend in the power centers of Europe towards American solutions—a United States of Europe with American-style politics and media dramas. “Bosnia” is a bundle of straws in that wind.

European union has been a State Department demand since the beginning of the Cold War. Washington seems remarkably complacent about the prospect of a serious European rival. There is plainly an ideological imperative at work. Washington needs a highly privileged ally—on the model of Britain forty years ago—to help the West face the Asian future with confidence. Washington needs to show that the American model can be reproduced outside America if China and Russia are ever to become global-democratic.
Europe therefore must be stabilized as a single liberal imperium, lest it reverts to nation-state unpredictability. Only a single Europe may be expected to help impose the World Trade Organization on everyone else, and without this extension U.S. intellectual property rights cannot become globally secure. If Microsoft is ever to universalize the use of its software protocols and then to tax every electronic transaction in and around our globe—Globalist Nirvana—the enforcing power would have to be tremendous.

These assertions about the political process provide a framework for understanding Washington choices. It is not a question of presidential strategy, because there might be none. But what the European outsider senses in Washington is an imperial grasp of how to manipulate chaos, shortsightedness, and brutal self-interest in the name of higher purpose. The invocation of high purpose, though remorselessly crude and infuriatingly tendentious, is not bogus: it is ideology. It is also traditional. Consider how the isolationists were outmaneuvered in 1939-1941: dramatic crisis management, financial and trade embargoes, safe zones, protected areas. This repertoire of techniques is now very familiar.

Roosevelt’s actions may not have seemed very coherent. He was a politician fighting to prevent a suspicious Congress from strangling his preference—but his preference was war, and he got his way. God knows, the cause was good, but we may consider how he reached his goal and then admit that even Studs Terkel’s “Good War” had its downside. An ideological intensity was deployed not to justify but to facilitate a refusal to notice when an opponent was trying to meet America halfway. This was used to bypass majority opinion, and Japan was successfully provoked. Like nuclear weapons, that is a trick that cannot be unlearned.

In the quality of its parliamentary institutions Europe is now starting to resemble America: incredible and dysfunctional at the quasi-federal summit, still functional below. If we ever get to a real European High Parliament, the Tower of Babel will be reinvented. It would surpass Capitol Hill in the dreadfulness of its political debate. Speech itself might wither away. Euro-parliamentarians would surely dispense with oratory and earphones and express themselves by clicking on icons after viewing “presentations” based on newsreels and artwork. In any case, Europe too is passing from the honorable estate of parliamentary government to the infernal condition of endless empathetic electioneering about next to nothing.

Half our politicians are Clinton clones. We are set up for new “Bosnias,” including Bosnia II, because we will need, from time to time, problems which can be bombed. There is a process of civic decay which leads to bread and circuses: humanitarian crisis, CNN, and intervention. A parliament cannot represent a continent: the region is too large, and all that is possible is pork-barrel squalor, glutinous sentimentality, and episodes of hysteria when media-nominated international enemies practice “defiance.” No patria, no patriotism.
But if the great nations cannot have patriotism, shall it be allowed in the others? If not, matters must be pushed to a conclusion. There is a dominant ideology: hedonism, victimology, and antitribal correctness; and of these parts the greatest is the first. Standing against it, or forced to do so, there is what can be rustled up as the nationalist opposition. Among the postpatriotic consolations of the New World Order is the growth of a metropolitan chauvinism, a new self-righteousness more unreflective than anything known even in the age of imperialism.

The nationalists are not really defiant: those that cannot play to the global gallery as victims prefer to get along with their cantonalized existences without exposure to worldwide media scrutiny. But the dominant trend will not allow them off the hook without a display of deference. The dominant ideology needs episodic challenges and will boldly seek them out. Once a note is passed down from Media Control, journalists will duly turn over the designated stones to expose nationalist toads.

During the recent war in Croatia and Bosnia, many Serbs were undoubtedly in the grip of patriotic emotion, but in front of foreigners they choked up and hardly dared speak the name of their passion. The Croats and Muslims knew that they must tell polite lies. Their own chauvinism—their reckless attack on Serbs, Serbian interests, and Serbian pride—was very lightly masked as a principled objection to constitutional innovation or as an undying attachment to multiethnicity.

But the only lies that the Serbs could remember were the Yugoslav lies, and Media Control had decided at the end of 1991 that the Yugoslav Lie should be replaced with the Bosnian Fiction. So when confronted by the international media, the Serbs were struck dumb. An enchantment deprived them of the capacity to say anything except that the media were unfair. The enchantment was ideological: the combined magic of old Yugoslav taboos and the threat of New World Order disapproval. The globalists’ psychoanalysts said that the Serbs were sick with self-pity. The truth is rather that they were shocked and confused that it was so difficult and dangerous to be patriotic.

If the Serbs had really been a peasant people untouched by modernity, they could have declared and secured the Great Serbia their rivals feared most. But despite pretending otherwise, the Serbs were remarkably vulnerable to disapproval. Confused both by the old communism they had not quite escaped and by the new globalism they wanted to negotiate with, their nationalism adopted a strangulated and offended tone which was new to them and well-nigh incomprehensible to others.

Those whom the gods wish to destroy they first strike dumb. That was the great ideological achievement: the presentation of nationalism—by the liberal media machine to the Euro-American audience—as pure delinquency and foam-flecked inarticulateness. (Asia did not matter at all.) For the Anglo-French liberal media, as for CNN, the fact that the nationalism was Serbian was almost incidental. The Milosevic regime acted out a
debased role to perfection. Its domestic propaganda switched from gutter nationalism to censorship and Stalinist absurdity, and its foreign apologetics never rose above low-brow mendacity. It made, voluntarily or under inducements yet to be uncovered, a signal contribution to the New World Order it purported to oppose, and it fed, by its crimes and criminal incompetence, the confidence of interventionists on both sides of the Atlantic.

Let us pass from the specific (Bosnia) to the general (rhetoric). The BBC World Service, which represents an older and more critical set of news values than those brandished by CNN, was prevented, in the Reagan-Thatcher decade, from starting World Service TV until too late. Even so, Asia prefers the BBC, and it remains an intolerable threat to Washington’s control of the image. The BBC radio audience is bigger than that for CNN International, but the World Service is today being dismantled.

A few of us know this is unnecessary and wrong, but the very idea of a nationalized asset which is not anchored in the Euro-American media market and the alliances of its major players is considered an unsustainable insult to the globalist media aristocracy. The idea that state patriotism and broadcasting quality should remain in strong alliance is judged imprudent, and suddenly the World Service seems—to the sort of British who will pay any price to sit at the top table—as out-of-date as imperial tariffs. I fear that the BBC World Service, and the BBC’s incomparable video library, will eventually be sold and pass into foreign hands.

The handling of the Bosnian question came at an extraordinary time and was rich in implications unguessed at in 1991. When the Yugoslav crisis first broke, a Europerson called Jacques Poos (Luxembourg) declared that the “hour of Europe” had struck. We were soon invited to consider this ridiculous, and to acknowledge the continued vitality of American leadership. But Poos was half-right. American leadership is not quite as American as it once was. The hour that struck was the hour of Euro-America: the central alliance of the New World Order. America had no entry into the Balkan game except as Germany’s enforcer. When the Anglo-French pragmatists detected the ideological strength of the globalist powerplay, they backed off until there was no alternative to bombing the Serbs. This does not mean that the story is over, or that Europe is fully signed up for continental union, Media Control, a convergent Euro-American politics, and a common ideological platform; but that is the trend. Bosnia was handed to Holbrooke with only the smallest pang of Euro-grief.

The Zeitgeist is not about to be challenged by a right which has embraced high capitalist recklessness or by a left which will swallow anything to be allowed to crawl back into the ideological limelight. Yet the demoralization of the national elites—or their global moralization—has been exaggerated by the shock of 1989. The architects of the European superstate are overreaching themselves in the push for monetary integration, and they will need to be very deft to deflect the nationalist counterstroke. Europe remains rich in national variety. A continent briefly unified under the globalist legitimism of the
superrich might be rebroken by a revival of spirit in the patriotic lower orders and by political parties which explore new international alliances. I do not “believe” in the Internet, any more than in the International Postal Union, but the work of Media Control might well become much more difficult than it is now. It is even possible that the educated classes will stop watching television.

It is time for the old right and the old left to speak to each other and to be conciliatory, for Buchanan and Chomsky to notice what they have in common, for the real Tories and real Gaullists to stand back to back and to make their peace with Scandinavian social democracy. Without new alliances no one will escape the global snakepit demanded by law firms, oil companies, and media corporations.

The patriotic understanding of authority, law, democracy, and economic self-determination needs a louder voice. Synthetic globalism can best be opposed by a genuine internationalism, a civilized respect for the patriotism of others which offers the only true and just approach to the Serb-Croat problem or the Northern Irish problem. The black helicopters assisted the Croat destruction of the Serbian Krajina because the globalists cannot get their minds around this possibility. It is they that insist that there must be zero-sum games and fairy stories; victims and fiends; Croats and Turks to win, and Serbs and Kurds to lose.

The ideological capacity of Media Control is not strong but weak. The West did not win the Cold War on the ideological front. On the contrary, capitalist democracy was in all sorts of trouble among the educated classes of the First and Third worlds, and it was unable to supply much inspiration to the few struggling for freedom inside the communist world. Marxism, like the Soviet economy, deconstructed itself well before 1989. But it had been almost unscathed by capitalist polemic. The rediscovery of the market, which is a genuine milestone for the European left, is a belated recovery of knowledge which the left abandoned, despite Keynes’s warnings, when European intellectuals started grasping for a pseudoreligious absolutism after World War I—the greatest disaster known to our culture. What saved the West in the aftermath of Nazism was not the atomic bomb but working-class dislike of the antipatriotism and compulsion visible in the Marxist recipe.

Any serious New World Order needs to change the U.S. a bit, the European Union a lot, and Japan a great deal. That is the trilateral vision. What has been learned recently is how internal opposition to its military shape—NATO expansion and activism—can be disabled and distracted by “Bosnian” episodes. An overwhelming superiority in high tech weapons, and high confidence in Media Control, will, if uncontested, make plausible a military intervention in Russia or China if one or the other shows signs of breaking up or going through episodes of Balkan “anarchy.”

We don’t want to fight,
But by jingo if we do,
We’ve got the bombs, we own the rules
We’ll have Siberia too.

Or Manchuria. The heart of this world order would be, essentially, an alliance of capital investing states made stable by their materially well-rewarded middle classes. But will the United States remain stable enough, can Europe (not just Serbia) be denationalized, and can the rigid patriotism of Japan really be conscripted by Euro-America?

The janissaries of the New World Order confront vast problems. But the worst is that they have nothing to offer the masses—anywhere—except the policed and pitied presence now available to blacks in New York, London, and Paris. This alone should be their undoing. But let us not seek comfort in the prospect of apocalypse; let us hope, instead, that the rebalancing of world power takes place sooner rather than later. Until then the survival of good sense will depend on a revival of critical energy on the patriotic right and the anti-imperialist left and an accommodation between them so chaste, serious, and accurate that the dominant trend will know itself to be challenged. The globalists do not relish real debate. They have little flair for ideology and will trust to Media Control. Whomsoever the trend wishes to destroy, it must first strike dumb.

If the history of patriotism cannot survive in the universities it must survive on the bookshelves of bookstores. J.G.A. Pocock (a good historian), writing in the London Review of Books, warned recently that new immigrants—in this case to New Zealand—might be content to do without a history, and to join themselves to the forces demanding that nobody shall have one. But his broader point is convincing: “We face a future in which it cannot be guaranteed that histories will supply identities any longer; but in that world, powerful inputs will continue to be made by those people who have histories and are not afraid to write them.”

The Serbs are now virtually disbarred by their critics, crimes, and enemies from patriotic action on their own behalf. But they can still write, speak, and sing; and they must, even if the enemy returns to the Field of the Blackbirds riding black helicopters.
Today Sarajevo, Tomorrow Chicago: 
The Tyranny of Human Rights

Thomas Fleming

The War Crimes tribunal going on at the Hague is the first test of one of the great principles of postwar politics—the Nuremberg Doctrine which makes individuals liable to international prosecution for actions committed during a war. In the old days, military personnel and police officers were expected to do as they were told. In time of war, a soldier who refused to obey an order could and would be shot, sometimes without a hearing. Officers and soldiers who shot prisoners or mistreated civilians might be punished by their superiors; otherwise, the only penalty inflicted on a guilty army was enemy retaliation—you kill your prisoners, we’ll kill ours.

But after the Nuremberg trials, the phrase—always spoken with a phony German accent—“I vas just following orders” became both a standing joke and a reproach against anyone who refused to disobey a dishonorable order. (Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 8: “The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment.”)

At the time, there were people who were severely critical of the Trials. At least one of the American prosecutors later thought they were conducted unfairly, more in the spirit of Stalin’s show trials than a like an Anglo-Saxon trial by jury, and even recent evidence has been published showing the prejudices that influenced the judges in deciding which prisoners were executed and which let go.

The obvious fact of the matter was that after a war the losers were being tried by the victors, and even under the best of circumstances, it would be hard for a defeated nation to get a fair trial from its enemies. The aftermath of World War I shows that. All the great powers—England, France, and Russia, as much as Austria and Germany—were more or less guilty of starting the Great War, but crippling reparations were enforced against Germany by the Versailles treaty, which also required Germany to hand over accused war criminals to be tried by the victors. In the event, some officers were put on trial in Germany for committing “crimes,” even though similar crimes had been committed by the allies.

There is another similarity between the aftermaths of the two world wars: the Versailles Treaty and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points were a preliminary attempt to
establish a uniform code of international conduct, according to which the Kaiser was to be charged with “a supreme offence against international morality.”

War is terrible, and even the best men do things which would otherwise be regarded as crimes: they destroy houses, kill some people deliberately and others through carelessness. Winston Churchill—who did all of the above in two world wars—was honest enough to see the hypocrisy of Nuremberg. Churchill, Anthony Eden, and even many Americans thought that the top Nazis should have been killed as soon as they were captured, without setting a dangerous precedent for international revenge.

This is not to say that the Nazi regime did not deliberately commit mass murder against Jews, Poles, Russians, Serbs, even Italians, and that the ringleaders should not have been summarily shot—like Mussolini, who was a choir boy compared to Hitler. Afterwards, a new German government could have settled scores, as best it could, with the other criminals according to German law. Or, if we had to have a trial, if it were limited to clear evidence of international murder—the slaughter of the Polish Jews, for example—no harm might have come of it.

Instead, the allies established three very dangerous principles: first, that conspiracy to make war is a crime by itself: “Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression” (Article 6a); second, that subordinates can be held responsible for carrying out orders (after World War I officers were acquitted because they followed orders, although in one case a naval officer was held culpable, because he knew the orders themselves were illegal); and third, that it is criminal to wage war against civilians; this includes such acts as “murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population.”

Conspiracy. By the above standard the following American Presidents are undoubted war criminals: John Tyler, James K. Polk, Abraham Lincoln, William McKinley, Teddy Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, as well as Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Bush, and Clinton. In some cases we might think these Presidents were justified in initiating a war, in others not. But most leaders of great nations, at one time or another, make plans to wage a war, when they think it is in their nation’s interest—or in the leader’s personal interest.

I do not approve of aggressive wars. I have, in fact, opposed virtually every American military action taken in my lifetime; but until George Bush and Bill Clinton are dragged to the Hague in handcuffs and tried for their aggressions, I shall remain opposed to this hypocrisy.

Following Orders. Suppose you are a German soldier on the Russian front, and you are told to assault a village and take no prisoners. What do you do? If you refuse, you die on the spot. In fact, many German officers did exactly that and were shot. They were
heroes, martyrs, and we bless their memory. But how hard can we be on a 17-year-old conscript who did as he was told and lived with the nightmare for the rest of his life?

It is not as if American soldiers have never done anything similar. During World War II, American soldiers more than once murdered their German prisoners, and Eisenhower gave orders against “coddling” POWs. It has been argued that this led to the death of hundreds of thousands. The figure may be exaggerated, but a great many Germans disappeared.

In the war in the Pacific, both the Americans and the Japanese fought a war of extermination against each other. I heard one marine officer, who had been at Pelelou, joke about how American journalists had admired the marines’ marksmanship: all the dead Japanese soldiers had been shot in the forehead. In fact, wounded Japanese soldiers were routinely executed because of their nasty habit of calling for medics and then blowing them up with a grenade.

**War Against Civilians.** Everyone knows of the My Lai massacre, but such incidents were a routine occurrence in Vietnam. There were even special groups of Navy SEALS (Mike Beamon, “The Green-Faced Frogmen” in Santoli, 203-219) whose job was to sneak into Vietnamese villages to murder civilians and make it look like the work of the Vietcong. We used massive air strikes against population centers, defoliated the forests, and used flesh-burning napalm indiscriminately. Finally, the nations responsible for the fire-bombing of undefended German cities are in no position to point the finger at war criminals. Say it was justified, say that it saved lives—the Germans thought they had a noble purpose in killing Jews. As one British foreign officer (A.W. Harrison in Bradley F. Smith, *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg*) put it in 1945, “Bomber Harris must have got more victims on his conscience than any individual German General or Air Marshall.” The judges at Nuremberg appear to have been aware of allied war crimes because they refused to allow any but German documents to be introduced as evidence.

The United States collaborated with the British in the firebombings, but we bear sole responsibility for the use of atomic weapons against civilian population centers. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are an ineradicable black mark on this nation’s character, on the President who made the decision, and on the people who reelected Harry Truman in 1948.

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The Hague “tribunal” is only a faint echo of the Nuremberg trials. The alleged war crimes of the Serbs fall into the same categories; but even if they were all proved, they are trivial in comparison with anything done not just by Germans but by Americans in recent years. At Nuremberg, at least, an effort was made to fix the blame on the Nazi leadership: men who had preached a doctrine of racial superiority, laughed at Christian morality as weakness, and insisted that their strength and superiority gave them the right
to treat other nation as slaves and cattle. There were no such leaders among the Serbs, and the so-called criminals who have been put on trial are so insignificant that they would not have been allowed even to testify at Nuremberg, much less enjoy the glory of a trial. The disproportionate number of Serbs indicted is clear evidence of a double standard at work.

The government of Croatia, in particular, has repeatedly refused to collaborate with the Tribunal. In early 1997, for instance, the Croatian ambassador to the Netherlands addressed the Tribunal to explain his country’s non-compliance, and even when they handed over the documents that had been requested, the ambassador continued to insist that “there could not be any suggestion that Croatia had given in to threats” (Klarin, February 10-15). In complying, Croatia remains defiant. By the criteria established at Nuremberg, there are three men who must be tried first, otherwise the whole episode is a farce, and those men are Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic, and Slobodan Milosevic—but they are the very parties who ratified the Dayton accords.

Like the Nuremberg proceedings, the Hague Tribunal is an irregular and illegal court. In the first place, the proper place for adjudicating international disputes is the International Court of Justice, but the ICJ has been virtually silent on the Balkans conflict (with one notable exception: accepting the case Bosnia v. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). In the second, the U.N. Security Council has no business involving itself in what was, after all, a civil war. The pretext was international security, but no one has ever taken the trouble to prove that there was a real danger of international conflict. As Professor Alfred Rubin has written recently: “If the Security Council, by its own vote, can categorize events in such ways as to avoid limits on its own authority...a radical change in the structure of the United Nations will have been achieved.”

In the third place, the United States and its partners in the Security Council have been careful to limit the investigation to crimes committed by the three parties to the Civil War. Just as at Nuremberg, where the Germans were not allowed to use any *tu quoque* arguments in their own defense, the activities of the peacekeepers themselves—including the use of American airpower against civilians—is not to be investigated. At least at Nuremberg, some of the judges did their best to insure a fair trial for the defendants, but this tribunal has been set up on the assumption that Serbs are Nazis, and that their leaders deserve to be hanged. As Srdja Trifkovic put it in the August 1996 issue of *Chronicles*, “The model for the Hague Tribunal is not Nuremberg 1946, but Moscow 1938.”

Were crimes committed by Serbs during the Bosnian Civil War? Undoubtedly. These things occur in all wars, civil wars in particular, but no impartial examination of the evidence has been able to attribute a criminal intention to Serb military commanders.
The most frequently heard charge is that the Serbs launched military attacks on civilian population centers like Sarajevo. There is a word for this—it is war. Even if the Serbs were responsible for all the faked explosions in Sarajevo, they would be guilty of nothing that the U.S. does not routinely do. In the Gulf War, before we ever committed ground troops, we subjected Iraqi cities to a murderous barrage of missiles and heavy bombardment. We completely destroyed their infrastructure—plumbing, water supplies, electricity, all gone. Nobody really knows how many hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians have died as a result of the bombing and the subsequent embargo (Cf. P.M. Gallois, Le Sang du petrole).

If we are going to talk about military terrorism against a people, then the United States should be accused of war crimes against the Serbs, not only for when we bombed the Bosnian Serbs into submission, but when our air strikes prepared the way for the Croatian massacres in the Krajina—massacres which shocked even the normally anti-Serb press. It was the most brutal episode in a brutal war, and the blood is on our hands.

Another frequent charge against the Serbs is ill-treatment of civilians. War against civilians was U.S. policy during the American Civil War, conducted according to the doctrine of total war. Sherman’s famous march to the sea, authorized by President Lincoln, was a campaign to break the Southern will to resist by reducing women and children to starvation. A similar plan was carried out in the Shenandoah Valley. In Missouri, all the inhabitants living in a long strip along the Kansas border were driven from their homes, which were then looted and burned by Union troops. These were not isolated incidents: the terror bombings of German cities in World War II had no direct military value—they were meant to cause disaffection of German people—but they had the opposite effect. The same can be said of the war of attrition waged in Vietnam or the brutal suppression of the Filipino independence movement in the Spanish-American War.

The European and American press also dwelt lovingly on rumors of rape camps. Upon closer inspection, most of the horror-stories of Serbian rape camps turned out to be either gross exaggerations or even outright fabrications. Were any Muslim women raped by Serb fighters? Probably, undoubtedly. Should they be punished? Of course, either by the Muslims or by their own government. Is rape something unusual in a war? Hardly.

The American army, it is said, raped its way through Germany, and the only soldiers punished were the unlucky few who refused to stop when the war was over. In fact, our record on this is still bad. The German government has repeatedly complained about the misconduct of American GI’s stationed in Germany, and the recent horror stories from Okinawa and Korea reveal that rape is still regarded as a venial sin by the U.S. military. More recently, American soldiers have been accused of raping their female comrades, and the most recent charges are coming from women stationed in Germany.
In the Civil War, Sherman’s men, when they were not burning and looting, spent their time raping the black slave women—a subject that few historians are willing to touch, because the unspoken assumption is that the victims were, after all, only black. In one famous case, in Athens, Alabama, a former Cossack officer turned over the town to be pillaged and the women—white as well as black, by the way—to be raped. When Ivan Vasilev Turchin was convicted at his court-martial, President Lincoln reinstated and promoted him. This is the same Lincoln whose government established the first American code of military ethics.

Drawn up by a German immigrant, Francis Lieber, this code was promulgated as General Orders No. 100. General Halleck, who authorized the code, was the military officer who also gave General Sherman’s soldiers their carte blanche to burn, loot, murder, and rape their way across what had been the richest section of the United States. This same government and this same officer bore responsibility for setting up the first concentration camp, designed to intern possibly pro-Southern Indians in the Southwest; this same government’s troops massacred an Indian encampment at Sand Creek, Colorado, at the very time that their comrades-in-arms were putting the torch to the cities of Atlanta, Georgia, and Columbia, South Carolina.

I have dwelled upon the war crimes of the United States, not because I hate my country or want to blacken its reputation. Many other countries have worse records. But war is usually a dirty business, and few nations have clean hands. One fact alone should make us despise the entire procedure set up at Nuremberg: the fact that Stalin, his hands reeking with the blood of 50 million victims, was one of the prosecutors. None of the Nazi defendants, perhaps not even Hitler, could match Stalin who even managed to prosecute the Germans for the massacre of Polish officers in the Katyn forest—a crime committed by the Soviets themselves (Smith, p. 104).

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I have spoken about the hypocrisy, but there is a greater danger in the Nuremberg mentality, and that is the underlying justification: that there is a set of international human rights that take precedence over national law, local custom, and religious tradition. The U.S. State Department and the American media it controls have repeatedly accused the Serbs of “human rights violations,” a charge that can range from rape and murder to an ethnic joke told in a private home.

Underneath all the horror-stories of rape camps and mass murder, there is an underlying principle to the State Department line, and it is this: Human beings are individuals whose only group affiliation is to a state that protects their human rights. Differences of religion and nationality are insignificant, and it is morally wrong for members of one group to discriminate against members of another. In Bosnia, for example, this means that a Serb would be wrong not to want a Muslim to move into his
neighborhood, or to oppose his daughter’s marriage to a Muslim or a Croat. When these prejudices become a policy of trying to preserve a Serb village or ensure Serbian political and military control over an area, the acts are not only wrong—they are criminal.

From this perspective, all the parties in Bosnia are guilty of human rights violations, but the Serbs are guiltier than the rest. Why? Because the Muslims, in their desire to control the entire region—let us not make the mistake of calling it a country—could play the multicultural card. Some of the descriptions of Sarajevo make it sound like San Francisco or Madison, Wisconsin; even the Croats—once they were bullied into forming a federation with the Muslims—were grudgingly multicultural. Only the Serbs were honest in declaring their intentions, which was to have either a separate Serbian state or else a Bosnian Serb republic within what is left of Yugoslavia. In the eyes of the international community, that desire by itself is a war crime.

Now, I am not going to stand up here and tell you that Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright really care about human rights. (The President has no time to think about foreign policy, he has enough to do just staying out of jail during the next few years.) A glance at the Geneva Convention will reveal at once the hypocrisy of the U.S. and Germany, since the preamble to the latest version adopted in 1977 contains this lofty statement: “every state has the duty, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” What else was the breakup of Yugoslavia but the threat and the use of force against that nation’s territorial integrity?

We should not waste time reciting the motives of U.S. foreign-policy makers—ignorance, greed, and lust for power. But the language and rhetoric of human rights, repeated over and over by prissy little chatterboxes like Nicholas Burns, has created the poisonous atmosphere that makes the Serbs guilty even if they have never mussed the hair of a single child-butcher ing Turk.

Where did such an idea come from? Since the Renaissance, philosophers have dreamed of such an international law, and by the 18th century most European nations were waging war according to certain rules which forbade the murder of prisoners and excessive mistreatment of civilians. In one sense, this is only good business: if wars are frequent, then whatever the Germans do to the French, they may, in the course of a few years, get a taste of their own medicine. The rule of tit-for-tat develops spontaneously even during modern wars: in World War I, for example, French and German soldiers respected each other’s mess times and struck up a trade in cigarettes, wine, and food, until their officers put a stop to it.

But the kind of international law that has developed in the 20th century is neither pragmatic nor humane. It is a kind of religion—the noxious gas given off from the decay of Western Christianity. Religious people, who see the image of God in their fellow
human beings, are often reluctant to go the full distance in brutality. But Western society has been only superficially Christian for the past two centuries. International human rights are simply the idea of divine law, with God left out.

Since, for people like Helmut Kohl, Madeleine Albright, and Bill Clinton, there is no god but ambition, power, and wealth, they are forced to disguise their crimes and double-dealing with the rhetoric of human rights and international law.

This idea of human rights has been kicking around for about five hundred years, but it took concrete shape during the French Revolution, when the revolutionaries proclaimed their declaration of the rights of man—the right to life, property, freedom, etc. But what they did was a dress rehearsal for Russian communism: they destroyed churches, murdered priests, raped nuns; they practiced scorched earth policy in the Vendée. Yes, in the name of the Rights of Man they confiscated property, massacred a large part of the upper class, they created a whole class of people called “suspects” who had no rights because of who their parents were—they even talked about taking the children of suspects away in order to indoctrinate them.

The Soviet constitution, too, breathes with the warm glow of human rights, and since World War II the nations of the world have ratified or endorsed or proposed charter after charter on women’s rights, children’s rights, religious rights, and ethnic rights. During exactly the same period, the civilized world has witnessed an epidemic of child prostitution. Fifty years ago a man who assaulted a little girl or a little boy would not have to worry about getting a fair trial, because he would never have lived that long. The same goes for the rapist and the child-murderer. Now these psychopaths and degenerates are very unlucky if they have to spend a full five years in a psychiatric hospital.

Let me talk about just one of these charters: The International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In this convention, genocide is defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.” Genocidal acts include:

A) killing members of the group,
B) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,
C) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction,
D) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,
E) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Now, during the Bosnian Civil War, we heard a great deal about genocide. The Serbs were said to be practicing ethnic cleansing which was interpreted as a form of genocide against the Bosnian Muslims. But if we go over the list of genocidal acts
specified by the convention, we might reach a different conclusion. As for the first charge
(killing members of the group), all the parties are guilty. Serbs killed Muslims who killed
Croats who killed Serbs who killed Croats who killed Muslims who killed Serbs.

But let us look at the second and third charges—serious bodily and mental harm,
and the infliction of destructive conditions of life. Apart from the normal incidents of
war, the gravest bodily harm was caused by the embargo, which—as we now know—was
enforced only against the Serbs, and not against the Muslims and Croats. In fact, the
United States violated more than one international agreement by arranging the passage of
Iranian arms by way of Croatia to the Muslims. The embargo was enforced so
successfully against the Serbs that vital necessities—food, medicines—were not allowed
to enter into the country, and from Belgrade to Pale, Serbian children were dying because
there were no antibiotics or anesthetics for routine operations. A reporter had brought this
matter to the attention of officials of the Red Cross in Switzerland, and they admitted that
the Serbs were receiving very little Red Cross assistance compared with what the
Muslims were receiving. If the world ever found out, they added, no one would ever give
money to the Red Cross again, an organization that plays politics with human suffering.

Let us talk a moment about mental suffering. Over the past several years, I have
received letters and phone calls from Serbs and Serb-Americans all over the United
States, telling me the same story: that they were loyal Americans who loved this country,
but that they were beginning to be afraid—death threats in the mail, snubs and insults at
work, their children bullied at school. Last year, Alex Dragnich wrote a piece in
Chronicles going over some of the evidence of what Serbian kids are exposed to: teachers
telling them they come from a race of genocidal butchers; a Weekly Reader map
comparing the actions of Bosnian Serbs to “Nazi brutality”; even a crossword puzzle
where “Serb” is the answer to clues like “guilty party in Bosnia.”

Where does all this hatred spring from? To say that Americans get it from the
media is no answer, since Peter Jennings and Tom Brokaw know as little about the Serbs
as they know about nuclear physics, German philosophy, or life in Middle America. In
fact, the media campaign against the Serbs was orchestrated in the U.S. State
Department, which has knowingly propagated lies and hatred. If there is ever a real war
crimes tribunal, then these masters of hatred—Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright
—will face the same charges as Julius Streicher, who was executed for his anti-Jewish
propaganda.

The other categories probably do not apply to the Bosnian civil war, but it is the
policy of this administration to force contraception and abortion both on blacks and
Hispanics in the United States and upon Third World nations. The usually unspoken
assumption is that the world has too many Africans, Indians, and Asians, and not enough
Europeans. I say usually unspoken, because back when Planned Parenthood was getting
underway, its founders were very open in promoting eugenics, and beneath all their
humanitarian rhetoric today, the agenda remains the same: don’t let the colored races breed. Both the United States and the United Nations are part of this worldwide effort, which is defined—in their own convention—as genocide.

The final category of genocidal crimes is the transfer of children out of their group. Strange as it may seem, such transfers are increasingly common here in the United States. Many African-Americans have expressed outrage over the general pattern of adoption, which means that black children are brought up in non-black homes. I think they go too far, and the many white families who have adopted children of another race are obviously goodhearted people. And yet, black Americans have heard our good intentions before.

But there is a more subtle aspect of question of child transfer. Illinois has the most aggressive child protection statute in the nation. In most states, the operating assumption is that a child, whenever possible, should be kept with his natural parents. But because of several widely publicized horror stories, usually involving a criminally insane mother who kills her child, Illinois law no longer favors parents. Now it is only the best interests of the child. Who determines the best interests? Social workers and lawyers hired by the state.

Saving children from abuse is obviously a good thing to do. But what constitutes abuse? According to U.N. and U.S. statements on children’s rights, children have the right not to be spanked, the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of religious toleration, the right to be provided with information on sex and contraception. You probably do not realize that even as we speak, there are religious parents all over this country whose children are being taken away on unsupported allegations of abuse, there are home-schooling families whose doors are being kicked in by social workers who think there is something inherently wrong with parents who want to protect their kids from public education or who think their own religion is preferable to any other.

The Attorney General of the United States, Janet Reno, made her reputation in Dade County, Florida, prosecuting fathers for sexually molesting their daughters. In case after case, Reno violated every ordinary provision of due process guaranteed by the Constitution. Wives who refused to testify against their husbands—a right guaranteed by common law—were locked up and subjected to duress. In one trial, I have been told, Ms. Reno spent the night in the cell with the mother cum reluctant witness, and held her hand at the trial. In at least one of these cases, forensic tests have destroyed the case against the father, and both the Wall Street Journal and the Reader’s Digest have published exposés of the unmarried Attorney General whose distaste for the male sex is all too well known.

The justification for all this legislation is the doctrine of children’s rights. Until a few years ago, nearly everybody knew that children did not have rights. They could not have civil rights, because they were not legally persons—they cannot vote, hold office,
make contracts, incur debt. As for their human rights, we used to believe that children had a duty to love and obey their parents, and that parents, on the other hand, had the duty to feed, clothe, protect, and educate their kids. Bad parents were not abusing the rights of their sons and daughters; they were failing in their duties as parents.

This is not a semantic difference. In modern political theory, a right always turns out to mean a legal claim. If I have a right to an education, that means that I have a claim on somebody’s wallet, somebody who must pay for my schooling. In practice this means the government, which steps in, not just in cases of abusive or deficient parents. In fact, our governments—state and federal—claim to act *in loco parentis* for all the children of the country. This means that if a government agent decides that a child’s right is being violated, then the parents must face the full force of the state of Illinois or even of the government of the United States.

Even the State Department can get involved. A decade ago, in Chicago, an immigrant Ukrainian immigrant family decided they wanted to go home. Their son, Walter, however, wanted to stay with his aunt. Although no wrongdoing was ever alleged against the Polavchaks, the State Department stepped in to enforce Walter’s right to divorce his parents and stay in the United States. Back then, the excuse was communism. Today, it would be religious freedom or the threat of female circumcision (which has led some African girls to claim asylum). The details change, but the basic principle does not: the doctrine of human rights means that in Bosnia Serbs are forced to live in a country controlled by their enemies, and that here in the United States, no citizen is free to raise his kids, manage his business, or think his own thoughts.

The United States and its satraps on the Security Council have established a simple principle at the Hague: when other countries have problems, it is a matter for the international community to take up, but if the problem involves one of the permanent members of the Security Council—a question, say of Scotland or South Carolina demanding its independence, or of Attorney General Reno’s decision to massacre close to a hundred people in order to “protect the children” at Waco—the permanent members can exercise their veto power.

The so-called New World Order that so many American conservatives are obsessed with is only the American Empire doing business under a new logo. In the new American International, Inc., children’s rights are used as a pretext for killing children; in order to defend the territorial sovereignty of a nonexistent nation—Bosnia—a member nation of the U.N. had to be dismembered; and in order to assert the right of self-determination, the Bosnian Serbs had to be forcibly subjected to a government they hated. As an ancient Scot said of the First World Order, the Roman Empire: “they make a desert, they call it peace.”
Is there any hope? Yes, there is, but it lies not in the hills of Bosnia, but here in Middle America, where the citizens have begun to question government policies. American globalism abroad is cracking from the strain. The American foreign policy elite—never a very learned or astute class of people—are now in the position of those psychotics who think that it is their concentration that keeps the planets in their orbits: if they fall asleep, the whole universe will fly to pieces. This nation and its leaders lack the will and the mental clarity required of a great empire.

Meanwhile, here at home, the welfare-socialist state constructed in the 1930’s is falling apart—much as the Soviet Union disintegrated—and it is all the government can do to hold things together. More than a few Americans now understand that the destruction of the Bosnian Serbs might be a trial run for what can be done here in Chicago in the name of human rights. For the time being, it may be too late to do much for Bosnia, and we can only pray it is not too late to do something to save the United States.

Bibliography


The government of the United States is capable of swift and efficient action when it decides that the regime in a foreign country has outlived its usefulness, or has become a “threat” to what passes for national security inside the Beltway. Grenada, Panama, and Haiti all come to mind, but the methods deployed in this geographic area tend to be rather crude, and their direct application outside our hemispheric backyard is politically risky.

More subtle, and in the long run more efficient, is the method of cultivating internal allies and potential political protégés among the elites in the target country. This approach demands more than mere direct agents of influence, epitomized in the former Jamaican prime minister Edward Seaga, who was affectionately known to his countrymen as CIA-aga. It demands people whose personal and political credos correspond to the self-proclaimed values of the post-Christian Western world.

And so, from Prague to Tirana, from Riga to Bratislava, the chattering classes are repeating in a dozen strange tongues the mantra of “human rights,” “free markets,” “democracy.” It is their ticket—so they hope—to the good life of six-lane freeways, quarter-pounders, and television with over one hundred channels. To these new agents of “American” influence the credo is often delivered indirectly. What Albright hints, the Soros Foundation will proudly proclaim. To be condescending about one’s ancestors—ignorant peasant, anyway—is cool; to be aloof about one’s national culture is a must, if one is to get that elusive scholarship or at least a six-week tour of the States sponsored by the U.S. Information Agency.

In the former Yugoslavia, in Tito’s lifetime and in the decade following his death in 1980, there had been no serious attempt by the U.S. to develop or cultivate an alternative political team in Belgrade among the narrow stratum of the establishment which could have been considered friendly to “Western democracy.” In accordance with the Kennan Doctrine, Tito’s dictatorship enjoyed America’s *cheque blanche* to do as it pleased domestically, for as long as it shunned full rapprochement with Moscow. There had been endless serious violations of basic liberty and human dignity in “Tito’s Yugoslavia”: secret police clampdowns on real or imagined opponents of the system, periodical purges of unreliable university professors, market-oriented managers, and alleged nationalists of all shades. But they were not allowed to distort the Western story
—repeated by liberals and conservatives alike—of Yugoslavia as a “special case.” Tito was not “our” s.o.b., but at least he was not “theirs.”

Increasingly obvious structural weaknesses in the Soviet Bloc in the late 1980’s did not bring about a change. Even following the meteoric rise of Slobodan Milosevic, the man often presented as the embodiment of all that America detests, American diplomats in Belgrade totally refrained from “cultivating” any potential political alternatives to the ruling team. As Yugoslavia was nearing the abyss, and Germany proved increasingly unrestrained in its support for the two most vocal separatist-minded republics, Croatia and Slovenia, America refrained from making a bid for real influence in Belgrade.

In retrospect, this lack of involvement in a strategically sensitive part of Europe is unsurprising. There is now ample evidence to suggest that the United States did not build up alternatives to Milosevic because it had decided—early in the Yugoslav conflict—that his remaining in power would serve its interests in the region.

We shall leave to other contributors to analyze the reasons for the decision made in Washington in the winter of 1991-1992 to support the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims in the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. While the “why” of this decision is still open to debate, the fact itself is beyond dispute: the United States’ decision to defeat “the Serbs” has been the salient feature of American policy in the Balkans for the past five years. The corollary of such policy was the need to weaken the Serb side from without—through political isolation, U.N. sanctions, media-induced vilification, and ultimately military action—and from within, through the uninterrupted, unhindered rule of Slobodan Milosevic and his team, and through the exercise of their influence over the western Serbs in Bosnia and the Krajina.

In order to illustrate what Milosevic did not have to fear from the American side, let us remember how quickly various alternative teams in opposition to communist regimes were built up and promoted elsewhere in the region by the United States. A good example is provided by the launching of Charter 77 in Prague. Until 1988 few people inside Czechoslovakia, and even fewer in the outside world, were even aware of the Charter’s existence. This groupiscule of chain-smoking intellectuals tended to preach to the choir, in each other’s apartments, on the virtues of democracy and human rights, on the duty of the artist to preserve his integrity, and on the meaning of human existence under “Real Socialism.” It was a worthy endeavor, moderately interesting to a few Western freelance journalists paying their once-a-year visit to Prague; but it was unlikely to bring down the state. Neither the founders of the organization, nor Gustav Husak’s security service (which had them penetrated very early on) regarded the Charter as a serious threat to the regime.
And yet, when the structural weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc led planners in Washington to decide that it was time to develop a Western-friendly alternative in Prague, an efficient mechanism sprung into action without ado. Quasi-independent foundations (for democracy, human rights, artistic freedom, or whatever) suddenly discovered and lionized Havel & Company. Sunday supplements of the New York Times and the Post were full of “in-depth profiles” of Havel, in color no less; lecture tours for the members (and suddenly numerous “sympathizers”) of the Charter were swiftly put together by the Council for Foreign Relations and the USIA International Visitor Program, with a stop at the National Press Club an obligatory item on the tour.

This campaign not only created the perception abroad that the Charter movement and its leader were the obvious alternative to the communists, but, more importantly, it skyrocketed Havel’s influence inside his country, where his means of communication with “the people” had hitherto been non-existent. Thanks to the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe—who were “only reporting” what others were saying and writing—Vaclav Havel soon came to be perceived by many Czechs as a viable and desirable alternative to the increasingly moribund regime. When the moment came to press the button, with the “velvet revolution” of the autumn of 1989, the slogan Havel na hrad! (“Havel to the Castle,” i.e., the presidential palace) “spontaneously” came to the lips of a nation which was sick and tired of communism, but which had not been able to develop its own alternative to the old team. The rest is history, including the swift disintegration of the Czechoslovak state, the eventual inclusion of the Czech Republic in an extended NATO, and the wholesale subjection of the Czech economy to foreign interests, from the gigantic Skoda Works (now under German control) to the old Pilsner and Budweiser breweries, under new, American management.

A similar scenario occurred the following year with Bulgarian leader Zhelyu Zhelyev, albeit with less effort and cost. But the simplest and cheapest such blitz was applied in Albania, where Sali Berisha was selected as the preferred candidate from the American point of view to bring down Hoxha’s successors, and the newly opened U.S. Embassy in Tirana effectively acted as his unofficial campaign headquarters in 1991-1992. According to an informed Washingtonian, Berisha’s victory “cost us a mere eight million bucks.” What his fall is yet to cost the people of Albania remains to be seen.

In early 1990, as the first post-1945 opposition parties were being established in Serbia, American policy makers had a wide range of potential choices on the emerging political map. Had there been any serious intent to undermine the position of Slobodan Milosevic—at a time when the Serbian president was ostensibly snubbing the United States by his refusal to talk to American ambassador Warren Zimmerman, and systematically undermining Prime Minister Ante Markovic, who was, in turn, ostensibly supported by Washington—it was possible to choose between a variety of emerging personalities. Probably most of them would have been eager to play the role of Havel:
Vuk Draskovic, Dragoljub Micunovic, even Zoran Djindjic would have gladly taken the opportunity to become the Uncle Sam-anointed future leaders of their nation. But this did not happen.

On the contrary, from the beginning of the acute stage of the Yugoslav crisis—during the premiership of Ante Markovic in 1989-1991—the opposition to Milosevic was written off in the American media and in political circles as “weak, divided, and irrelevant.” At the same time, curiously, Milosevic himself was being vilified (and almost grudgingly admired) as “the strong man of the Balkans,” whose hold on the Serbs was beyond dispute and not open to challenge. This attitude did not change as a result of the huge anti-regime demonstrations in Belgrade in March 1991, and the beginning of the war in Croatia. The media, led by the *New York Times*, were increasingly shrill in blaming “Milosevic’s Serbia” for the conflict, but without ever suggesting any alternative to him.

It was in June 1992 that it became clear that the United States wanted Milosevic to remain in power in Serbia, and that it was not going to do anything to jeopardize his position. The sanctions against the newfangled “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” had just been introduced, on the insistence of the Bush administration. The pretext was found in the first of a string of Muslim bomb stunts in Sarajevo—the famous “breadline massacre,” stage-managed by Muslims for the benefit of the world media and politicians.

Many Serbs were infuriated by the sanctions, which they perceived as harmful not to the ruling establishment but to the people of Serbia; initially, however, Milosevic seemed unlikely to reap any political benefits from American policy. He was also widely perceived as the blunderer, whose inability to define and defend national interests in the summer of 1991 produced the dramatic worsening of the overall Serb position in 1992. In fact, the opposition in Belgrade seemed to be gaining momentum: their preparations for a grandiose Saint Vitus’ Day rally in June of that year were accompanied by a string of pronouncements from various national institutions asking Milosevic to step down. The attitude even of his former allies was summarized in the words of the well known poet Matija Beckovic, “Go, so that Serbia may live.”

The prevalent view in Belgrade, especially among the opposition, was that the anti-Serb policy dictated from Washington had a lot to do with Milosevic’s Communist pedigree. They were unable to grasp that what they saw as a perfectly reasonable principle—the right of all constituent nations of the former Yugoslavia to self-determination, Serbs included—could be rejected by the “democratic West” in favor of preserving arbitrarily drawn boundaries between the republics. Accordingly, at different ends of the political spectrum in Serbia there existed a consensus on one point: if Washington were to send a strong public signal that Milosevic was an obstacle to the more balanced treatment of overall Serb demands and aspirations, his position would
become literally untenable. The democrats were hoping for such a signal, the communists feared it.

At that moment, in mid-June 1992, came a remarkable—and, as it turned out, shrewd—statement from Milosevic. He said he would gladly tender his resignation, and leave politics altogether, if he believed that his departure would improve the Serb position; but the problem—as he put it—was not him personally, but the anti-Serb policy of the United States.

This moment would have been eagerly exploited by an alert Foggy Bottom strategist, had there been any desire to weaken Milosevic. It would have been sufficient for James Baker, or his successor, Lawrence Eagleburger, to state that Mr. Milosevic was quite wrong, that the United States in fact regarded the regime in Serbia as part of the problem. Without any political price, or indeed commitment, it was possible to undermine Milosevic—possibly fatally so—by hinting that the change at the top in Belgrade could contribute to a re-examination of the overall American attitude to the Serbs in general, and to the issue of recently introduced U.N. sanctions in particular. The effect of such a statement at that time could have been immeasurable. At the very least Milosevic would have been hard pressed to respond to such a challenge, and his bluff of “resignation” would have been called. He would have been seen for what he is—a power-obsessive apparatchik who is ready and willing to sacrifice any national interest for the sake of remaining where he still is today.

Washington’s response was the exact opposite of this. In an interview with the National Public Radio, two days after Milosevic’s statement, Ambassador Zimmerman commented on Milosevic’s announcement with a remark that it was “of no consequence” to the United States who was in power in Serbia; but that whoever it be, he would have to observe the will of the “international community,” which in Zimmerman’s scheme of things means the United States. In effect, Zimmerman confirmed and endorsed Milosevic’s claim that the problem was not him per se, or his power structure, but the rigid unwillingness to validate any Serb claims in Washington.

A week later, also in June 1992, this attitude was confirmed when I attended a meeting in Washington with the assistant to the National Security Advisor for European affairs, Jenone Walker. Referring to the sanctions in the context of Milosevic’s offer to resign, she stated that—“quite apart from Milosevic”—they would stay in force until “all current and potential sources of conflict in the former Yugoslavia were removed, agreements signed and sealed, and respected by the Serbs to the satisfaction of the U.S. government.” Game, set, and match—Milosevic.

Ms. Walker’s boss, Brent Scowcroft, was less arrogant but equally frank, when he told us that the Bush administration had “no view on the political future of Serbia,” but had some definite ideas about the way the conflict should be settled. It boiled down to the
demand for the Serbs’ capitulation to Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb and Alija Izetbegovic in Sarajevo.

This attitude provided an enormous boost to Milosevic in his attempts to restabilize his regime in the late 1992. At that time he was still pretending to be at least implicitly supportive of the Serbs west of the Drina, in Bosnia and in the Krajina. His apologists could point to these statements from Washington as “proof” that any radical change at the helm would be detrimental to the Serbs’ national interest. The American government thus endorsed the claim of the Belgrade regime that “there is no alternative” to the Big Boss, and that any other government in Serbia would have to lay prostrate, beg for mercy, and sign an unconditional surrender—consigning the 2.5 million western Serbs on the wrong side of the Drina river to the tender mercies of their enemies.

At the same time, Milosevic’s continued rule in Serbia was used by the American media pack, led by the *New York Times* and the foreign policy establishment in Washington, as proof that the sanctions were justified and necessary, and that the collective demonization of the Serb nation could proceed unabated. “The Butcher of the Balkans” made the front page of several glossy news magazines, with stage-managed photos of “concentration camps” and fact-free stories of “systematic rapes” inside the covers. Managed mass democracy was getting the managed mass media it deserved.

The proponents of democratic change in Serbia, although somewhat demoralized, had nevertheless continued to try to get Western circles interested in a political alternative to Milosevic. I was involved in some of these attempts. At the end of July 1992 I accompanied Crown Prince Alexander on a visit to Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney in Ottawa. Prior to the meeting I drafted a detailed proposal, which was presented by the Crown Prince to Mulroney, that the Canadian government invite a delegation of prominent opposition figures from Belgrade to visit Ottawa. So, when in the course of our conversation the Prime Minister asked what he could do to help the cause of democracy in Serbia, we were able present him with a specific set of ideas.

Mulroney eagerly endorsed the document. Immediately, in our presence, he dictated a memorandum to his *chef du cabinet* for the ministry of external affairs, suggesting that “representatives of the democratic opposition in Serbia” come to testify before the foreign affairs committee of the Lower House. Before leaving we had agreed that they would be given an opportunity to speak not only on the situation in Serbia but also on the war, and put forward the other side of the story. Even though he did not explicitly endorse our argument that sanctions hit the people rather than the regime, Mulroney seemed prepared to provide a platform for the proponents of democratic change in Serbia who were willing to publicly expose this view in a “reasonable manner.”
Encouraged by this meeting, I stayed in touch with Mulroney’s foreign policy adviser, Paul Heinbecker, who requested a list of suggested names of invitees. This I duly prepared, taking care to include people with strong democratic credentials, fluent English and French speakers, some of whom would consider themselves patriotic, albeit with a small “p.” All of them were truly devoid of any hint of chauvinism. It was agreed that the visit should take place six to eight weeks later, in the second half of September 1992.

After that there was a long period of silence. Following my repeated inquiries by phone and fax, I finally received a call from Ottawa in the second half of August, in which I was told that the visit was called off. The reason? Apparently some Canadians thought it would be a good idea to include Washington in the itinerary, assuming that a possible testimony by Milosevic’s opponents before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be welcome to the White House and the State Department. When they contacted the administration, however, they were told that the proposed visit was “undesirable,” because “the opposition in Serbia is composed of nationalists who are no better than Milosevic.” I was told—off the record, of course—that a “strong signal” was given to the Canadians that, in Washington’s view, they should not go ahead with the visit themselves.

And so the sanctions remained, and so did Milosevic. They became inseparable. The sanctions had proved an absolute boon to the Milosevic regime. First, the Serbian president could blame them for the abysmal economic situation in the country, which was in fact due to the structural defects of an inefficient socialist economy—an economy he was unwilling to reform on political grounds. Secondly, he could use the sanctions as a pretext for the policy of gradual, and by 1995 total abandonment of the western Serbs, thereby eliminating a potentially serious threat to his power base in Serbia-proper.

Worse still, Milosevic could observe with calm equanimity the exodus of about a quarter of a million predominantly young and well-educated urban Serbs in 1992-1995, whose decision to emigrate was most often prompted by the sanctions. Those who had provided the backbone of political opposition to his government in 1990-1991 were leaving, and he was staying. The fruits of the sanctions are obvious only now, when his power has been shaken. The near destruction of the remaining urban middle class—which was hit hardest by the sanctions—means that the critical mass for that final push is simply lacking in Belgrade, regardless of the looming social, economic, and moral collapse of the nation.

Having already reached my own conclusions about the view in Washington concerning Milosevic, I was not surprised that the United States persisted with the same course in the fall of 1992, when it had an opportunity to do otherwise. The prime minister of the rump Yugoslav federation at that time was Milan Panic, a flamboyant Californian businessman who was installed with Milosevic’s approval but soon refused to do his bidding. In order to enhance his credibility Panic was desperately appealing for even a
token gesture of support from Washington. He was specifically asking for humanitarian deliveries of heating oil to be exempted from the sanctions (the winter season was approaching), and hinted that such a symbolic gesture would at least give him some leverage in his attempts to unify the opposition. But Panic was rebuffed by the United States. It was clear for all Serbs to see that his conciliatory policy—exemplified by the complete withdrawal of the last Yugoslav troops from Croatia—went unrewarded.

The benefactor was Milosevic, yet again, who could ridicule Panic as a pathetic buffoon, a trickster who was bluffing the nation with his claim that he could count on Western support against the president of Serbia. Emboldened, in December 1992 Milosevic called snap elections.

In spite of considerable handicaps (the greatest of which was the unrelenting state control over the media, especially television) Milan Panic—by now Milosevic’s unrestrained opponent and presidential candidate of the opposition—was unexpectedly doing quite well in the polls. The gap between him and Milosevic, considerable at the beginning of the campaign, was reportedly shrinking fast. And then, yet again, a statement came from Washington which suddenly improved Milosevic’s position. Just two days before the vote in Serbia, the lame-duck Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, declared that—in his opinion—Slobodan Milosevic should be indicted as a war criminal.

Now, this man Eagleburger knows his Belgrade, and understands the Serbian mentality. He had spent many years in Belgrade and had been culturally attuned to the place well enough to know of inat, that hard-headed, and often self-defeating spite so typical of the Serb psyche. Eagleburger must have realized that the best way to rally people around an increasingly unpopular leader was to “tell” them just how bad he was, especially from the “American” point of view. He was probably well aware who was going to be helped by such a statement. Unsurprisingly, the clip with Eagleburger’s diatribe was eagerly carried by state television and all government-controlled media in Serbia. I know personally of an old Belgrader, a life-long anticommunist, who voted for Milosevic that one time—“just to show the Americans.” Poor fellow, little did he suspect that he was acting just as expected, and desired, by those same “Americans.”

Only someone unacquainted with the true objectives and modus operandi of American foreign policy would be surprised by such a gap between officially proclaimed objectives and reality. Let us therefore jump four years in time to the massive wave of anti-government protests which swept Serbia following Milosevic’s attempt to manipulate local election results in November 1996. At first the turmoil which brought hundreds of thousands of people to the streets of Belgrade and other Serbian cities was simply ignored in the West.
It took more than a week of continuous street protests in Belgrade for the State Department to issue the first (mild) rebuke of Milosevic. “The Serbian leader continues to be a necessary diplomatic partner,” pontificated the New York Times in a November 28 editorial, while American diplomats in Belgrade were quietly advising protest leaders to refrain from “going too far” and demanding Milosevic’s resignation. The British ambassador in Belgrade, Ivor Roberts, enjoyed unrestricted access to Milosevic, and had been active in trying to defuse the wave of protests. Such ambivalence prompted the Times (of London) to bewail Western disregard for “the ruthlessly undemocratic nature” of the regimes in Serbia and Croatia, warning that the view of Milosevic as a pillar of regional stability was inherently flawed. But this was a lonely voice amidst the media chorus, especially in America, which warned that “Dayton” was doomed if any real change were to occur in Belgrade.

So what is the secret of Milosevic’s success in making himself indispensable? The answer is simple: his readiness to play the role of the New World Order Gauleiter in the Balkans. The Serbs of Bosnia and Croatia were understandably unwilling to submit to Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic; but they were unable to resist without help from Serbia itself, and were doomed to defeat once Milosevic decided—at the height of the wars of Yugoslav succession—that they could pose a threat to his undisputed authority. In the words of Vojislav Kostunica, a leading opposition politician in Belgrade,

Milosevic decided some time in early 1993 that he would rather have total control in a very small Serbia, than risk competition from Pale and Knin. The logical outcome of this was his preference for the Croatian victory in the Krajina, and for the Muslim hegemony in Bosnia. That explains why he did nothing to help the Serbs in Croatia, and that’s why he has sold the Bosnian Serbs down the river at Dayton.

By betraying the struggle for self-determination of the Serbs west of the Drina, by calmly stabbing them in the back, Mr. Milosevic has shrewdly purchased the lasting benevolence of those who run today’s “Western democracies.” Indeed, it was with the skins of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs that he has turned himself from “the butcher of the Balkans” into “a necessary partner.”

Having ignored the very existence of the Serb opposition to Milosevic for the best part of the past decade, the United States government was forced to make some token gestures of support to it only when his position seemed seriously threatened. But even then, overtures were directed only at those figures in Belgrade which are judged “safe” from the globalist perspective. This meant that the soon-to-be-defunct three-party coalition Zajedno (Together) needed to be quickly Havelized, and subsequently kept in reserve—just in case the Serbs did not listen to the voice of wisdom from Washington, and decided to do a Ceausescu on Milosevic and his hated wife.
It hardly needs stating that America’s brief support to the Zajedno coalition had nothing to do with the alleged democratic credentials of its three parties, and everything to do with the degree of its leaders’ professed readiness to act in accordance with the diktat from Washington. Hence the sad spectacle of all Zajedno coalition leaders swearing by the prevailing form of social and political organization in Western Europe and the United States, and invoking it as panacea for Serbia’s many ills. Vuk Draskovic, Zoran Djindjic, and Vesna Pesic: the trio was successfully portrayed in the Western public eye as “the opposition” in Serbia. Throughout the political turmoil of 1996-1997 the troika rejected any serious debate on the causes, meaning, and lessons of the tragedy which befell their nation in this century. By doing so the leadership of the Serbian opposition successfully reduced its target audience to those segments of the Serbian body-politic which were deemed politically correct by Clinton and Albright: the segments that were submissive to “the West,” antinational to the point of self-hatred, brazenly materialistic, antitraditionalist, and secular.

With such leadership of the opposition movement it is unsurprising that the popular discontent with Milosevic could not have been channeled into a victory for his enemies. The Zajedno coalition was warned in no uncertain terms by Washington to shun all “unsuitables”: not only open nationalists such as Vojislav Seselj, but even thoroughly moderate patriots with impeccable democratic credentials—such as Dr. Kostunica—were simply not kosher enough for the U.S. State Department.

The resultant failure to forge a united opposition front against Milosevic was described in some Western capitals, yet again, as “the failure of the Serbian opposition.” In the meantime, predictably, Milosevic has reconsolidated his grip on power after a tricky period. Western chanceries could breathe a sigh of relief: whatever Izetbegovic and his Washingtonian advisors decide to do to the Republika Srpska in 1998, no unpleasant surprises are to be expected from the eastern bank of the Drina. From the standpoint of the American Embassy in Belgrade the policy has paid off admirably. An internally weakened Milosevic has been allowed to linger on, but his weakness guarantees his even greater pliability when he is faced with new demands—over Kosovo, Sanjak, the Hague Tribunal, or whatever.

On the opposition front only those who swear by Diet Coke, and who speak the language of ten-second CNN sound-bites, are recognized as potential alternatives to the Big Boss. This “democratic” opposition still parrots old slogans from the 1980’s about something called “United Europe.” Contrary to all evidence supplied by Bonn and Brussels, they go on pretending that this project is miraculously still open to those less fortunate nations of the Old Continent which happen to adhere to the Orthodox tradition.

While this posturing is simply pathetic, the “pro-Americanism” of Draskovic and Pesic is plainly embarrassing. Draskovic, the Balkan Candide devoid of any endearing innocence, does not know and does not understand America, but he thinks he knows what
is expected of him in terms of lip-service and rhetoric. Ms. Pesic, worse still, rather likes what she finds in its centers of power. She is the ambitious Balkan clone of Hillary Clinton and Susan Sontag, and her compulsive chain-smoking is the only concession she has ever made to the Balkan tradition. The story those two tell the Serb public after their low-level meetings in Washington is a curious mix of brown-nosing, ignorance, and outright manipulation: *Sesame Street* blended with agitprop.

What they do not tell, perhaps because they do not know, is how deeply they are despised by their Washingtonian interlocutors. It is useful, having quislings handy; but it is unpleasant having to humor them. The job is usually left to junior staffers and GS-11 bureaucrats. The movers and shakers can afford to be aloof with their would-be clients from Belgrade. Serbia is not a very important place per se, and there is no cost, political or otherwise, to being rude to the Serbs. The place does not matter, but it was useful for an exercise in the destruction of traditional nationhood, New World Order style.

The Serbs’ striving to remain part of one state when Yugoslavia started disintegrating—a desire as natural as it is reasonable—was proclaimed from inside the Beltway to be the deadliest of sins. It was repeated *ad nauseam* by the dominant political, academic, and media elites of the Western world, whose goal is a globe in which any bonds of loyalty borne out of centuries of shared experience will be eradicated. The Serbs in Belgrade were to be forbidden to help the western Serbs, in the Krajina and in Bosnia, in their struggle to be the masters of their own destiny in the lands they had inhabited long before the first Pilgrim Fathers celebrated their first Thanksgiving. And now, the United States has the president of Serbia, as well as his supposedly implacable political opponents, shouting “Amen.”

With such ringing diplomatic success, it may be too much to expect a shift in Western policy towards the Serbs in general, or Milosevic in particular. Such policy is shaped by people who have failed to recognize—or, worse still, understand but do not care—that the same forces which have torn Bosnia asunder are also present in many American cities, as well as in Marseilles, Berlin, and Amsterdam. The natives, or at any rate their elites, have been successfully denationalized, but the newcomers are refusing to leave their atavistic baggage back home in Algiers, Chittagong, Tijuana, or Lagos.

And so “Bosnia” is bound to happen in Southern California, in Yorkshire, and in Brandenburg, if our society remains on the same course charted by the pseudoelites who run America and Western Europe today. These *corífei* of rights without liberty, the high priests of lives without substance, are not different from Slobodan Milosevic, the seedy apparatchik who had never, ever been that “Serb nationalist leader” of a thousand Western editorials. Throughout his decade in power they have acted as his discrete mentors, because they are anti-Serb; and throughout the wars of Yugoslav succession they have been anti-Serb because they are anti-American, and anti-European.
The scars of this past decade will take a long time to heal, even if America eventually shakes off the ignominy of the Clinton presidency, and even if the current push for the supranational “United Europe” is defeated by the joint efforts of all who love the Old Continent too much to allow its destruction through integration. But whether the emaciated remnants of Christendom on both sides of the Atlantic still have the will and the ability to reverse the dominant trend is open to doubt.

*L’affaire* Milosevic illustrates the tempora and mores of the Western world as it nears the new millennium. Auberon Waugh has predicted that the next will be a worthy successor to this altogether awful century—a brazenly triumphant era of “thuggery, muggery, and buggery.”
**The Role of Russia**

Yelena Gusskova

Now that the Yugoslav crisis is in its sixth year, it is prudent to ask why it has lasted so long, and why it is still far from over—the rhetoric and virtual reality of “Dayton” notwithstanding. Had the key international players truly wished to resolve the nascent crisis in the Balkans, there is little doubt that they could have done so anytime after mid-1991. Sure enough, all of them claimed to be striving to attain peace, but their actions were fatally flawed. Their endless violations of the law of nations, disregard for the realities of history, brazen lack of objectivity, and escalating anti-Serb stand could hardly contribute to a true settlement of the conflict. Two countries—Germany and the United States—have played the main destabilizing roles in the Balkan crisis.

Germany has acted as a catalyst in the conflict in Yugoslavia from the outset, as was initially apparent in its pressure on its European partners to extend hasty, premature, and ill-advised recognition to the secessionist Yugoslav republics. Not unlike other European countries, only more brazenly so, Germany made use of the Balkan conflict to attain its national goals. The unified Germany seeks leadership of Europe, no longer only in the economic sphere, but also in politics. However, it has to overcome the barriers to its new ambitions, barriers which resulted from the postwar European security system.

For this reason Germany seeks to obtain the status of a permanent Security Council member, to legitimize its military presence outside its borders, and to boost its political and military potential. After its initial strong-arm tactics in pursuit of recognition, Germany has sought to act unobtrusively in pursuing its long-term policy in the Balkans. Slowly but surely it has ensured its “presence” in the former Yugoslavia: it became a member of the Contact Group, took part in the Rapid Reaction Force, and its representative was installed in Mostar as EU administrator.

German foreign policy became strongly Balkan-oriented in the late 1980’s. Germany’s strategic goals in the Balkans presupposed the inclusion of Croatia and Slovenia in its economic zone, providing it with the control of major international crossroads and ensuring direct access to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, as well as an extended section of the Danube valley.

If the corollary of such a policy was single-minded support not only for Croatia but also for Bosnia’s Muslims, its welcome consequence was the favorable disposition towards Germany of its chief oil and gas suppliers in the Arab world. Germany’s
insistence on the international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Muslim-dominated “multiethnic” state had a geostrategic logic based on its decision-makers’ perception of their country’s best interests. The same logic prompted Germany to support Croatia, to supply funds and arms for its separation, to protect it from sanctions regardless of its crimes, and to spur on military actions.

For its part, the United States switched over, during the last decade, from seeking consensus with its friends and allies to imposing its will on them, as well as on its perceived foes. The U.S. rediscovery of fist-banging in international relations was explained by some proponents as the rightful return of America to the road of global international relations.

Several commentators have found America’s explicit anti-Serb bias hard to understand, but the fact is undeniable. There are several possible explanations for the anti-Serb edge of Washington’s policy. Regardless of their relative weight, those reasons are a result of deliberate policy choices of certain policymaking elites in Washington, and not a result of some “error” or “misunderstanding.” There was the desire to exploit the breakup of former Yugoslavia as a legal, political, and military-strategic precedent for the breakup of the former U.S.S.R. Support rendered for the Bosnian Muslims was supposed to prove that the U.S. does not have an a priori anti-Muslim bias. The Serbs were a soft target anyway, and humbling them was a low-cost foreign policy “success,” welcome in the run-up to Clinton’s reelection. By extending the role of NATO to the Balkans, the U.S. revitalized an ailing organization, confirmed its leadership within it, and laid the ground for an eventual expansion of NATO eastwards. Last, but by no means least, there was the desire to redefine and strengthen the political role of the U.S. in Europe: Washington has taken steps to convince its partners that not only the Yugoslavs, but also the Europeans, can never cope with their problems without the U.S.

The U.S. administration had to take Russia into account when developing its Balkan strategy. Various methods were used to reduce Russia’s influence by taking advantage of its internal crisis. Until the end of 1991, Russian policy was marked by its support for Yugoslavia’s unity; but in February 1992, Russia made a sharp turn in its appraisal of the developments in Yugoslavia. It admitted the fact of federation’s breakup, but refused to take part in the settlement of the crisis. Moscow’s passivity made it possible for the Western countries to build their own system of relations with the former Yugoslav republics.

Russia attempted to make its stand closer to the American one, without necessarily asking for any concessions or counterfavors. Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was instrumental in pursuing such policy. Due to the absence of a federal mechanism of elaboration and adoption of decisions on foreign policy issues, decision-making in the diplomatic field increasingly depended upon him personally,
especially after the signing of the Belovezh Agreements in December 1991 and the breakup of the U.S.S.R.

The Russian policymaking establishment was attracted to Europe and the U.S. by the notions of democracy and economic prosperity. It apparently believed that the establishment of friendly relations with the leaders of Western countries would lead to a conflict-free situation. Moreover, Russian diplomacy explicitly negated the aspect of national interest in its foreign policy. The self-proclaimed absence of Russian interests in the Balkans was skillfully exploited by Western diplomats. Kozyrev agreed on all points with his American counterparts, and acted accordingly. Being wary of Russia’s anticipated pro-Serb stand, the West was quite happy that it had succeeded in attaining “a high degree of harmony and identity of views” between Western and Russian approaches to the Yugoslav crisis. In Lord Owen’s opinion, Russia played “a very constructive role” in the diplomatic process. It did not exercise its right of veto, although Yeltsin was subjected to considerable pressure by the nationalists.

Russia had made some effort in the spring of 1993 to reassert its role, but it turned out that Moscow’s traditional place had already been occupied. The United States preferred to make use of Russia in pursuit of its own goals in the Balkans, exploiting Moscow’s traditional contacts with the Serbs in order to pressure the Serbs into maximum concessions. At that time, the Vance-Owen plan for peace in Bosnia was being discussed, and it was necessary to find a force which could exert influence on the “intransigent” Serbs. That was exactly the time to contact Russia. As even some Western media have noted, the West was pinning hopes on Russian-Serb contacts as a means of implementing Western plans and designs.

Kozyrev’s approach—based on the uncritical parroting of the rhetoric of “post-Cold War cooperation”—overlooked the fact that there are two strategic goals of American foreign policy which are as important today as they have been at any time since 1945. One is that the U.S. retain its role as the perceived leader of the “international community” (previously the “Free World”). The other is that America remain the world’s foremost economic power, which demands a strong influence in the oil-rich Middle East and explains Washington’s curious identity of interests with Iran in support of the Bosnian Muslims. These objectives are likely to continue to dominate American foreign policy thinking for the foreseeable future.

The former foreign minister is now universally condemned in Moscow not so much for having failed in Bosnia—and on the issue of NATO expansion—but for not having tried. Even his previous supporters accept that Kozyrev has failed to establish where Russia stands in the new international order. He has foisted on Russia an ideological policy—based on Albright’s and Christopher’s cynical rhetoric—which has become more duplicitous the more it has failed. After Kozyrev, the Russians will have to reexplore political reality in foreign policy.
And so, far from being treated as a “partner” in the New World Order, Moscow was reduced to the status of a tool of Western policy. It was used for the sole purpose of exerting pressure on the Serbs; it was even allowed to be generous with promises to the Serb side, but it was denied any chance of fulfilling them. During the Sarajevo crisis of February 1994, this contradictory role of Russia became quite obvious: Russia acted as the carrot, and NATO as the stick. In response to Russian pressure, the Serbs withdrew heavy weapons from the Sarajevo region—while the Bosnian Muslim government did nothing of the kind—and gave their consent to reopen the airport in Sarajevo and to open the one in Tuzla.

Russian diplomats showed special zeal in their attempt to make the Serbs give in on the subject of the Tuzla airport. There are few well-equipped airfields in Bosnia. The Serbs understood its strategic importance, and they were adamant that the Tuzla air base would not, under any circumstances, be ceded to UNPROFOR. Russia’s offer to assume control of the airport, confirmed by Andrei Kozyrev, served as the final argument that influenced the Serbs to make concessions. The airport was duly opened. Russia was celebrating what seemed to be a rare diplomatic victory; but in reality, it had every reason to grieve over its political oversight. Not a single Russian promise was realized. Extensive military supplies reached the Muslims through the Tuzla airport. Furthermore, after the agreement ostensibly ending the Bosnian war was signed in Dayton, it became clear that the U.S. intended to keep Tuzla as its military base.

The U.S. regularly paid lip service to Russia’s importance in the resolution of the crisis, but it never took Russia’s stand into account. Moreover, whenever—in the view of Washington—Russia dared to go too far in its diplomatic activity, resolute steps were taken to put it in its “proper” place. For instance, in Vladivostok on March 14, 1994, Secretary of State Christopher subtly intimated to his Russian colleague Kozyrev that Russian diplomacy should refrain from making any “excessive fuss” which could jeopardize the intricate web of compromises woven by Washington’s envoys. He advised Moscow—come what may—not to stir things up, and to return to the blessed time when Russians were invited to talks as “cosponsors”—essentially, to take the Americans’ chestnuts out of the fire, if necessary.

More often than not, Russia was simply not informed about any actions to which Moscow might react in a manner ill suited to American interests. In February 1994, the ambassadors of three powers—the U.S., Britain, and France—visited U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and demanded his approval of planned air strikes, in total disregard of Russia’s stated position. In April 1994, yet again, Russia was not informed of planned air strikes against Serb positions. According to the Moscow Foreign Ministry statement of April 11, 1994, “regrettably, Russia was informed antedate about the decision to use the air power.” This incident even prompted President Yeltsin to talk to President Clinton. Yeltsin claims that he insisted that it was unacceptable to make a
decision on certain issues—such as striking Serb positions—without preliminary consultations between the U.S. and Russia.

Evidently, Russia’s verbal assertiveness did not undermine NATO’s determination to launch new air raids. The Westerners correctly assumed that the Russian president and his foreign minister placed too much value on Russia’s “stable” contacts with Western Europe and the United States to put them at risk because of Bosnian Serb “intransigence.” In a TV interview, Kozyrev’s assistant and personal envoy to Pale, Vitaly Churkin, soon charged the Serbian side with the major responsibility for the deteriorating situation. After talks with Secretary of State Christopher in late April 1994, Moscow never raised the issue of its opposition to air strikes, and hurried to assure the public that no disagreement existed between the U.S. and Russia. According to Christopher, Boris Yeltsin went out of his way to assure him that “nobody will succeed in driving a wedge between Russia and the USA, between him and President Clinton.”

The Big Seven’s Halifax decision on Bosnia was adopted in June 1995, without a formal consultation with Russia. All decisions had made before Yeltsin’s arrival. Illusory as the independence of Russian Balkan policy had been, in the summer of 1995 it vanished into thin air. Initially a founding member of the Contact group, Moscow was not even invited to the session held on August 3, 1995, because of Russia’s publicly stated disapproval of Croatia’s offensive in western Bosnia.

At the London meeting of foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of staff of the countries which had peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia, held in July 1995, Russia finally acted with some independence: it went on record (together with the Ukraine) as insisting on a political resolution of the crisis. Owing to Russia’s efforts, the political conference in London was not transformed into a military one, and the concept of resolving the problem by use of force did not prevail at that time. Therefore, independent NATO action was needed, if force was to be used against the Serbs. A plan of attack was adopted by NATO on August 2, 1995, after Boutros-Ghali had surrendered his powers of veto. Decision-making having thus been transferred from the U.N. to NATO, Secretary of State Christopher stated with satisfaction that the agreements reached “did not depend on the Russians’ approval,” or—more generally—on Russia’s vote.

The Balkan crisis has drastically undermined the old international and European security systems. It has revealed their ineffectiveness and impotence, and it has instigated a new alignment of forces, in a struggle for redrawn spheres of influence. Russia has been ousted from its traditional zone of interest, while the political, economic, and military presence of the U.S. and Germany in Southeast Europe has increased enormously.

As a consequence, considerable shifts are currently taking place in Russia, which has finally been forced to reexamine its national interests. Russia had gone too far in trying to improve relations with the West, and it must in the future defend its own
interests more forcefully. There can no longer be talk of “strategic alliance” with former Cold War opponents. At best, the goal can be a “civilized partnership,” or in some cases a “privileged partnership,” in which the two sides would do their best to avoid conflicts. Russia’s aim should be to pursue its interests more actively and more effectively, while not allowing events to slide towards confrontation and Cold War. The Kremlin needs to learn how to act as a counterbalance to an America which—let us openly admit—is trying to dominate the world in the absence of the Soviet Union.

The change in Russia’s posture will come too late to effect the outcome in the Balkans. But since the U.S. was able to dictate the terms of a Bosnian settlement, Russia can expect that it soon will attempt to dictate solutions to problems such as Chechnya, Crimea, and other issues arising from the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. This could result in a renewed Cold War that could easily turn hot. At the very least, it would kill the potential benefits of cooperation between Russia and the U.S., to the detriment of both nations.

The former Yugoslavia is the test case of Russia’s relations with the Western world for decades to come. Quite apart from the obvious impossibility of NATO troops in Bosnia being “fair” and “impartial,” their presence creates a precedent which may lead to the establishment of NATO bases in Latvia, Estonia, or the Ukraine. Following the expansion of NATO eastward, Moscow is fully justified to suspect that there have always been people in Washington and Bonn—such as Senator Dole, or Zbigniew Brzezinski, or Mrs. Albright—who regarded “Russia,” rather than “the Soviet Union,” as the enemy.

Russia’s reappraisal of its national interests—one hopes—may lead to a rediscovery of its proper role as a great power, and enable it to take an active part in the development of a model of general security for Europe in the 21st century.
The Balkans and U.S. strategy in Europe

James Hill

The suggested title of my brief contribution seemed clear enough. The problem, as it turned out, was to provide a coherent answer. Our strategy? In Europe? In the Balkans? Is there any such thing? We may be forgiven for our skepticism.

From the beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 U.S. policy in Europe seemed reasonably clear, and could be summed up rather cleverly: To keep the Russians out, the U.S. in, and the Germans down.

That world does not exist anymore. But the structure for upholding the Atlantic Charter, the multimember defensive alliance we know as NATO, still does. Its continued existence reflects the basic dilemma: What do you do with a military alliance, one with nuclear weapons and a guarantee interpreted to say that an attack on one member is an attack on all, when the perceived threat that brought all together no longer exists?

There is no easy answer to this, because foreign policy planners - some of them working from past experience, most working on advancing their careers - will always be on the lookout for a new threat, and a new “mission.” They serve as mighty advocates for keeping the alliance up, running and ready.

But let us just look at the map of Europe since November of 1989 and see where this new threat to the alliance might be coming from:

Is it a new Germany, a Fourth Reich, if you will, rising? Even if it was, “NATO-for-ever” enthusiasts are not telling us if their insistence on keeping the alliance together - and even expanding - is all just a clever ploy to make sure the Germans continue to behave themselves.

Is there a serious attempt being made, by any power, to annex Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary? I do not think so; and in the long run a threat from another NATO member is as plausible (if not even more so) than from Russia.

Is imperial Russia on the march again? Doesn’t appear to be. Still, we are told, one never knows, it might be. So NATO planners in Brussels, and politicians in the West, particularly in Washington, fret to no end about expanding NATO eastward. But prior to adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to its roll call NATO went shopping for a post-Cold War mission, found it, argued for it, and eventually got it - in the Balkans.
With the exception of some ethnic communities scattered throughout the United States and Canada, the Balkans is probably the furthest thing from the mind of our body politic. We have been conditioned to think - if we thought at all - of the Balkans as one of history's ancient problems, finished for good with the allied victory in World War II and the advent of communist systems in most of the Balkan lands. Interestingly, the collapse of communism did not alter our narrow view; in fact, it had just the opposite effect – it reinforced it.

And thus, when first Slovenia, then Croatia, then Bosnia and Herzegovina began to pull away, too often violently, from the Yugoslav federation, the reaction of American public opinion was all too often a collective yawn. Few votes were to be won arguing either for or against intervention, and so a mind-set was allowed to develop that said this was Europe’s problem, and Europe must settle it.

That is easy to say, difficult to accomplish when the European defense mechanism consists largely of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, and of course, the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This fact explains why this was never to be only Europe’s problem. A superpower, not even one led by Bill Clinton, does not sit still.

So, as the death and human misery toll continued to mount in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the U.S. news media became fascinated with reports of massacres and ethnic cleansing. It was not fascinated enough in most cases, however, to get out of Sarajevo and actually report as to what was or wasn’t going on. As the clamor began to rise “to do something,” the Clinton administration actually torpedoed a number of proposals for settlement advanced by Lord David Owen and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Vance’s subsequent replacement, Thorvald Stoltenberg. Clinton sent in an egomaniacal diplomat-investment banker named Richard Holbrooke instead, who was to broker a peace agreement that has come to be called the Dayton Accords. Dayton, and the run-up to it, provided NATO what it had been seeking since 1989: something to do.

NATO warplanes (read, American warplanes) flew missions over Bosnia and delivered air strikes that essentially ended the fighting; NATO troops (read again, mostly American) remain because the peace, though preserved, is too fragile to let go. And in the process of finding NATO a mission, the wunderkinds in the Clinton administration national security apparatus actually introduced Iranian arms into the war theatre. This was a violation not only of the arms embargo the administration was pledged to support, but also a diplomatic game of footsie with a regime the United States officially condemns as a state sponsor of international terrorism. (Interestingly, this did not seem to bother many Republicans on Capitol Hill, who saw their hopes of recapturing the presidency dashed because they constantly let a liberal Democrat get on the right of them.)

Why the GOP big guns seem so intent on allowing the coddling of the mullahs to go unpunished? Their restraint might say something about Washington’s overall thirst for
oil; it may reflect a perverse realization that Clinton’s duplicity somehow excused GOP perfidy with Iran during the Reagan administration; or more simply, it shows that the so-called conservative revolution was certainly no revolution, but something more akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. The inability to carry out this revolution against a re-elected president who put a “for rent” sign on the Lincoln Bedroom and took contributions from Asian sources including the government of China is proof enough of this point.

So a cynic could be forgiven if he noted that the U.S. long-term strategy in the Balkans is to stay there for as long as it takes - until another Berlin Wall topples. The only problem, of course, is that that wall began to fall in November 1996, when peace laureate Slobodan Milosevic annulled the results of elections in 14 municipalities throughout Serbia, including Belgrade.

The march of democracy, one of the stated intentions of a proactive American foreign policy, had noisily come to Serbia. Not surprisingly Washington’s boy in Belgrade wanted nothing to do with it - and, I might add, neither did Washington’s boys in Zagreb or Sarajevo. The Clinton administration, which a year earlier had argued the case to station American soldiers in Bosnia, suddenly fell mute on the subject of democracy for neighboring Serbia. Two weeks into the pro-democracy protests, the State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns threatened renewed sanctions if Mr. Milosevic were to crack down, effectively threatening to punish the Serbian people if they are punished by their president’s riot police! In the same league is Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright’s “strong” letter to Mr. Milosevic from February 1997, urging him to allow an independent news media. Judging by his subsequent record he was evidently underwhelmed by Albright’s strength.

But these are simple exercises in window dressing to hide the fact that neither President Clinton nor Vice President Gore nor precious few others in what constitutes the U.S. foreign policy establishment have the stomach to agitate from the bully pulpit for a democratic Serbia. (To be fair, they don’t seem to have much stomach for democracy in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, or, to judge by their panic when Boris Yeltsin’s re-election was in doubt, in Russia either.)

No, there is little talk of democracy in the Balkans, no more certainly than there is talk of democracy in China, Indonesia or Burma. What the Clinton administration does talk about endlessly is the value of recent expansion of NATO to Russia’s doorstep, begging the very important questions: Are we friends now, or still foes?

This is U.S. imperialism taken to its illogical conclusion. To the delight of Islamists from Teheran to Tuzla, and globalists from Boulder to Berkeley, these NATO enthusiasts are still plotting new iron rings around an enfeebled Russia, which threatens to lead to the final showdown, the completion of the suicide of our common civilization.
Peacekeeping in the form of the Bosnia mission is not an appropriate way to project U.S. interests abroad. Must we send in troops to separate and disarm factions, always throwing up a DMZ as has existed in Korea for almost half a century? Or should we, now the world’s only superpower, use the strength of our democratic ideas - along with the technology of electronic media and the Internet - to spread the news that there is a better, more peaceful way, based on the respect for the rights of the individual, the respect for all thoughts, the settlement of disputes through laws and the democratic processes.

I think our government’s response in Serbia is telling. I will remain optimistic however. Miracles, as we have seen during the Serbian protests, can – and do – happen.
"Benevolent Global Hegemony"
The United States as the World’s Policeman

James George Jatras

Every once in a great while, an article appears in a “mainstream” publication that, so to speak, lets the cat out of the bag, by spelling out clearly and explicitly certain ideas and trends that have long been dominant factors in public life but are usually seen only in vague or implicit form. One such appeared in the July/August 1996 edition of *Foreign Affairs*. Entitled “Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” it was intended as a blueprint for a Dole administration, and no doubt also a claim for high appointment for its authors, Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, both editors of the flagship of neoconservatism, the *Weekly Standard*. It could best be summed up as an appeal for America to become the embryo of a world empire.

Indeed, the authors’ recommended American role in the post-Cold War international order can be seen as descriptive as well as exhortative:

What should that role be? Benevolent global hegemony. Having defeated the “evil empire,” the United States enjoys strategic and ideological predominance. The first objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America’s security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world. The aspiration to benevolent hegemony might strike some as either hubristic or morally suspect. But a hegemon is nothing more or less than a leader with preponderant influence and authority over all others in its domain. That is America’s position in the world today.

The world now being, evidently, our “domain.” Other powers, notably Russia and China, will bristle at American hegemony, but they’ll just have to lump it, we should take their displeasure “as a compliment,” und so weiter. Predictably, the authors call for a military buildup unconnected to any identifiable military threat:

Great Britain in the late 19th century maintained a “two-power” standard for its navy, insisting that at all times the British navy should be as large as the next two naval powers combined, whoever they might be. Perhaps the United States should inaugurate such a two- (or three-, or four-) power
standard of its own, which would preserve its military supremacy regardless of the near-term global threats.

They call for “citizen involvement,” in effect, militarization of the populace (in a complete perversion of the traditional “citizen soldier” concept) and their seduction into the imperial enterprise: “to close the growing separation of civilian and military cultures in our society,” to “involve more citizens in military service,” to “lower the barriers between civilian and military life.”

Perhaps most disturbing about the Kristol/Kagan call to greatness is how they define our interests: Americans, they write, “have never lived in a world more conducive to their fundamental interests in a liberal international order, the spread of freedom and democratic governance, [and] an international economic system of free-market capitalism and free trade.” That is, this has nothing to do with how we will preserve the traditional moral and economic interests of our own people, keeping other powers out of our traditional empire in this hemisphere—what we usually mean by “national interests”—but with the blessings we will supposedly bestow upon the rest of benighted humanity, assumed to be, as Kipling put it, half devil and half child.

They continue: “American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and the international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible.” In sum, hegemony for hegemony’s sake: we are obligated to take up the white man’s burden, to shoulder the Sisyphean task of preserving the existing international order, seemingly forever.

In fairness to the Republicans it should be noted that there is greater uneasiness on the GOP right about this trend than there is on the Democratic left, all of whose non-interventionism seems to have evaporated with the demise of communism. A piece appeared in the New York Times on December 19, 1996: “Madeleine Albright’s ‘Munich Mindset’,” by Owen Harries, editor of the National Interest, a “mainstream” conservative foreign policy journal. Harries takes Albright to task for her “enthusiasm for action [of an] apparently indiscriminate nature,” her seeming to “favor intervention generally and on principle,” and her viewing the world as “an endless series of Munich-like challenges.” Whatever one might think of Colin Powell on any number of points, one can only agree with Harries that the question she once put to the general—“What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”—is nothing less than “simple-minded.”

Harries’ warning fell on deaf ears as Albright was unanimously confirmed as Secretary of State by the Senate, 99 to nothing. For those who lament the demise of bipartisanship: Madame Albright, meet Messrs. Kristol and Kagan, or for that matter, Jeane Kirkpatrick. This is now the norm—Tweedledee Anthony Lewis, Tweedledum
William Safire. Make no mistake, whatever ordinary Americans might think, the political, media, and intellectual elites, regardless of their party affiliation, are firmly behind the hegemonist enterprise.

**The Post-Cold War World**

At this point it would be appropriate to make a few notes about the international system within which we are embarking upon this grand venture. This means first of all some observations about the state of European civilization, of which the United States is a part, although a very peculiar part. Today, it is hard to believe that just a few decades ago, before 1914, the Western world—Europe, Christendom—little doubting its obvious superiority, cultural as well as technological, over all other peoples, exercised direct authority over virtually the entire world, over all other civilizations. The only serious exception was Islam, as represented by the Ottoman Empire, which was widely seen to be on its last legs. The Christian peoples of the Balkans had lately thrown off the Turkish yoke, and prospects loomed for the reconquest of Anatolia.

All of this came crashing down when “the lights went out” all over Europe in 1914. Due largely to the same arrogance that had fed the rush for empire, and which, with little modification, impels our contemporary neo-imperialists, the European powers embarked upon an orgy of autogenocide that probably has never been equaled at any time on any continent. And not content with that, they gave it another go a mere two decades later, in 1939-1945, with the half-century of the Cold War to follow. The result is a civilization that is just a shadow of its former self, crippled, wounded—perhaps fatally—culturally, morally, religiously moribund. Perhaps most telling, it is demographically moribund: when people refuse to produce offspring at even bare replacement level, this is sure evidence the disease is terminal.

We are still, of course, living in the wreckage left over from World War I. It is generally acknowledged that among its results was the spawning of two very similar, crassly materialistic, anti-traditional, modernizing, gnostic ideologies (in the sense of Eric Voegelin’s *The New Science of Politics*), each of which had found a home in one of the defeated empires: first of all, in Bolshevik Russia and then, largely as a reaction to communism, in National Socialist Germany. The activities of these two states—twins, in many ways—and the other powers’ concerns about them, were primarily the occasion of World War II; the activities of the twin that survived and expanded its power in that conflict, the Soviet Union, were the occasion of the ensuing Cold War.

This much is obvious. But what is not generally acknowledged, and what perhaps is only now becoming obvious, is that the Great War did not produce (and by produce I mean serve as a catalyst, not cause: the roots are much deeper) just two such gnostic ideologies but *three*: the twins were actually triplets. While the third child of the war superficially resembled the old empires that had gone to war in 1914—there was still a
king in London, the Third Republic continued to sputter along in France—what was missing was even the pretense that civilization rested upon the old certainties, primarily religious in origin, without which, it was assumed, ordered and moral life was impossible.

Men were no longer ashamed to admit they were atheists; after all, if God really existed, how could He have permitted that slaughter? The antitraditional impulse that had been growing for decades, perhaps centuries, before 1914—antitraditional in a broad sense: anti-God, anti-Church, antiking, antinobility (“The voice of the people is the voice of God”), antinational, antipatriarchy: it is no accident that suffrage was extended to women at this time—that impulse vastly accelerated after the war and, bit by bit, subtly but inexorably, established itself in academia, the media, and in government. Today it holds untrammeled sway over virtually all formerly Christian countries. What had once been apostasy had become the ruling religion.

As evidence, consider this list from the celebrated June 1993 Foreign Affairs article, “The Clash of Civilizations?” by Samuel Huntington. The thesis of the article is that in the post-Cold War world the clash of ideologies (which had superseded, in turn, clashes among nation-states, dynasties, and religions) would itself be superseded by a clash of civilizations, which he designates as Western, Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, etc.

As both Alain Besançon (The Rise of the Gulag: Intellectual Origins of Leninism) and Igor Shafarevich (The Socialist Phenomenon) have shown, among the characteristic features of modern gnosticism, usually encountered in the form of socialist ideology, is a completely closed, circular system of thought. Indeed, it might be more correct to refer to a nullification of thought, an impediment to rational discourse and description of social and political phenomena. What instead appears (as epitomized by Marxism-Leninism) is a dualistic pseudoreality in which words and concepts are given a special ideological significance distinct from their normal real-world meanings. This pseudoreality demands actions aimed at forcing the real world to conform to the ideological vision. Ideology does not appear fully mature, like Athena springing from the forehead of Zeus, but rather, as Besançon observed, becomes apparent when “it has attained its pure, developed form, [having] gone through a historical cycle”:

The history of ideology could be compared to the different successive stages in the lives of certain parasites, which go through a cycle which is apparently capricious, but which is in fact necessary to their complete development. They must, for instance, go through a river mollusc, then pass into a sheep, and finally lodge, not without deleterious effects, in the body of a human. In the case of ideology, the host organism is a nation, whence it will return to the river. At every change of location, there is an equivalent change of form. (The Rise of the Gulag, p. 19, original emphasis)
At this point, I think it is possible to state that what I have called the gnostic “third child” of the 20th century, the sibling of communism and national socialism, is finally reaching its ideological synthesis. That ideology—democratic capitalism (the name which it has proudly chosen for itself)—having completed its incubation period and outlasted its rivals (indeed, having absorbed a number of their impulses and even, in many cases, their former personnel, much as in the post-World War II period, in many European countries former fascists flocked to the communist party) is finally taking the center stage as the ruling ethos of “the world’s only surviving superpower.” While it would take another Besançon writing another *The Rise of the Gulag* to detail what may be an incipient totalitarianism, three key features deserve comment:

**Core Concepts.** Marxism-Leninism styled itself the champion of “Peace, Progress, and Socialism,” terms that had meaning only within the closed world of ideology. Likewise democratic capitalism touts as its principles a trinity of “Democracy, Human Rights, and Free Markets,” the latter being very broad and encompassing exchange of people—i.e., unrestricted immigration—as well as goods and services. These concepts do not necessarily have any relationship to the normal, nonideological meaning of the words and are in fact almost endlessly manipulable by the gnostic elite.

“Democracy” does not mean simply broad participation of citizens in the business of governance, but is an ideological concept that encompasses the progressive social content of the popular decision. Accordingly, if the citizens of California vote to withdraw benefits to illegal aliens or to repeal affirmative action, or if voters in Colorado prohibit localities from passing “gay rights” ordinances, this is not an exercise of democracy but a violation of democracy, and the courts are obligated to overturn the vote. Likewise, if the Danes vote against the Maastricht agreement, they have to vote again until they get it right; the same thing happened in Ireland on the question of divorce.

“Free markets” generally does not mean just the private exchange of goods and services for mutual benefit but encompasses—for instance—the right of financial elites closely tied to the government to have their risks underwritten by their less well-off fellow citizens, as in the Mexican bailout: profits are privatized, losses are socialized. As was the case with communism, the core concepts are understood to be manifest in an inevitable global march of progress toward (in Francis Fukuyama’s famous phrase) the end of history.

**Dualism.** Morality is a function not of objective behavior but of the place of the actor within the ideological system. Marxism-Leninism expressed the concept in terms of *kto-kogo*, who [gets] whom, and Maoism employed it to the extent of recognizing entire nations as either “progressive” or “reactionary.” We see the same dualistic concept applied by the democratic capitalists today: if Iraq kills Kurds, it is bad; if Turkey kills Kurds, it is good. If Muslims and Croats want to secede from Yugoslavia, it is
democracy; if Serbs (and now, Croats) want to leave Bosnia, it is aggression. If NATO warplanes fly over Bosnian Serb territory, the Serb air defenses are a “threat” to the planes, but the planes are not themselves threatening. Again, as was the case with communism, in which the U.S.S.R., as leader of the “socialist camp,” authoritatively judged states and their actions within the dualist schematic, the United States, having assumed leadership of the “international community,” makes similar judgments.

The *kto-kogo* parallel with communism even extends to the domestic sphere with, for example, the Bolshevik concept of the “socially friendly,” i.e., common criminals that the regime considered class allies against the bourgeoisie. We see a similar phenomenon in what Samuel Francis has designated “anarcho-tyranny,” that is, the seemingly helpless posture assumed by the reigning authorities in the face of real crime (murder, rape, drug dealing) juxtaposed with the brutality, including what the Bolsheviks called “extrajudicial reprisal” (cf., Waco), to which ordinary citizens are often subjected, as again Francis has recently documented in *Chronicles*.

**Host Organism.** One of the mistakes commonly made during the Cold War was to see an absolute identity between communist ideology, which could be likened to Besançon’s parasite, and the host, Russia. Likewise, while in the eyes of the gnostic elite the United States (the primary host organism of democratic capitalism) is reducible to a list of “shared values” (a favorite propaganda theme with the elites, Bill Clinton in particular), it continues to be the home of actual flesh-and-blood people who are expected to support the ideology and who, to various degrees, are bamboozled by it. In general, while the use of force is available to the elites, more useful is the employment of secondary concepts and movements such as feminism, environmentalism, homosexualism, consumerism, evolutionism, hedonism, educationism, antidiscriminationism, eroticism, etc. They are used to break down traditional moral restraints and national identity, leaving an atomized population without resistance to ideological direction.

Force is less necessary than it was in the case of communism or national socialism: there is no need (yet) to jail or commit to punitive psychiatry Joe Sobran, Sam Francis, or Tom Fleming—only to brand them as being outside the “mainstream.” As George Sunderland has put it, the main levers of control are not Pavlovian but Freudian, the message more subliminal than conscious. A symptom of the tension between rulers and ruled is the prevalence of conspiracy theories (usually involving the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, etc.), which, as Francis has observed, fall into the error of mistaking for ruling organizations those organizations to which the ruling elites often belong. Finally, while the United States is without doubt the main host (analogous, in the case of communism, with the Soviet Union), it is not the only one.

There is a definite symbiosis with the United Nations, and one of the sharp divisions among the hegemonist elites is whether - as the Clinton administration believes
- the United States should be the principal enforcer for an international order legitimated by the United Nations, or whether, as the neoconservatives believe, the United Nations should be brought into line with the dictates of a hegemonist United States.

In closing, it is hard to say whether the above consolidation is already an accomplished fact, or whether it is still short of its completed form. Has the United States already been irrevocably transformed into a second “evil empire”? I can say that even today in Washington it is almost impossible to have a serious discussion with most policymakers about our country’s interests without entering the world of pseudoreality, without being treated to an endless ode to the “shared values” of democracy, human rights, and free markets, along with a defense of the righteousness of forcibly “sharing” them with lesser breeds without the law. I concede that one of the disabilities of living and working in the hegemonist capital is a lack of appreciation for the common sense that I trust still remains in the country at large, which some believe will eventually beat back the ideological tide. Conversely, I submit that those living in the real America—which I assume is out there somewhere—little suspect how bad things really are. If any refutation of my pessimism can be made, I would be glad to be proved wrong.
The New Security and Moral Agenda
In a U.S.-Dominant World

Raju G.C. Thomas

The military, economic, and political dominance of the Western alliance in the post-Cold War era raises some troubling concerns about the role of a U.S.-led NATO, and the apparent new emphasis on “values” and “morality” in American foreign policy. At one time, American policy was concerned mainly with the country’s national security and the security of its allies, and the promotion of its (primarily economic) national interests abroad. Today, facing few specific military threats to itself or its allies, or any serious challenges to its general national interests, the United States has begun to turn to the promotion of American “national values” abroad, defining those values in terms aptly summarized by Jim Jatras. “Democracy,” “free markets,” and “human rights” are defined as good per se, and in need of no justification.

Despite the rhetoric of goodwill and benevolent intent coming from Washington, there are some dangerous implications underlying the new value-oriented American security and foreign policy agenda. Two basic questions are addressed in this essay.

First, will the use of force by a U.S.-led Western alliance (as witnessed in the former Yugoslavia), or even the threat to use force, undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states that do not subscribe to the American concept of the New World Order? In other words, with the passing of the Cold War bipolar balance of power, can other states trust NATO—and especially American—military power?

Second, when the United States decides to use military force, should it act on the basis of moral principles that it defines subjectively for itself, or should decisions to use force be determined by the likely (and usually anticipated) unjust consequences of such military actions? The problem is that the American use of force in support of strategic and/or moral principles has often had harmful effects on innocent people.

Related to this problem of unrestrained NATO power is the use of economic sanctions in lieu of military force, especially where force may not be a feasible or desirable option. Such U.S.-sponsored economic sanctions are directly targeted at nations or ethnic groups in order to reduce them to poverty and desperation, in the hope that they will overthrow their rulers, or that their rulers will conform to the demands of the U.S.
Military Balance Versus Military Preponderance

On the first issue, traditional balance-of-power theorists and practitioners have argued that, without countervailing power, there can be no guarantee of the sovereignty and independence of all states; moreover, the imbalance may lead to oppression and injustice. A free and democratic society relies on countervailing power, or on a system of political and legal checks and balances. The ability to preserve some semblance of freedom of policy and action for most states in the international system is not much different. The prevalence of a military balance of power in the world, or some other effective system of global political and military sanctions (such as a collective security organization), would appear necessary to ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of existing states.

A global military balance was considered essential during the Cold War. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. also attempted to maintain regional military balances in crisis areas such as South Asia (India versus Pakistan), the Middle East (Israel versus the Arab states) and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia versus Somalia). The U.S. even argued in 1993-1994 that only through military balance—both among the warring ethnic groups within Bosnia and among the new states that came out of Yugoslavia—could there be peace and stability in this region. But maintaining military balances within countries—among regions, provinces, or ethnic groups—would appear to be an unusual method of promoting internal peace and stability. Peace and security within a state are not maintained through military balances among rival ethnic groups or factions, e.g., blacks and whites in the U.S. or Hindus and Muslims in India. Armed conflict within states is usually prevented by a monopoly of military power by the government, or by some powerful political faction.

Now that the U.S.-led West is militarily, economically, and politically dominant, American leaders and observers argue that world peace and justice have a better chance without a global balance of military power, except in those regions (and even within countries) where such a balance advances American foreign policy goals, e.g., South Asia, the Middle East, and the former Yugoslavia. Preserving NATO without much military opposition was not enough. Expanding NATO is now the objective. And Russia is not supposed to feel threatened, because the U.S. claims there is no threat. In fact, Western military dominance caused instability and conflict at the very beginning of the post-Cold War era. The prime example is the former Yugoslavia. The weakness of the U.S.S.R. by the late 1980’s, and its sudden collapse in 1991, led to a preponderance of military and economic power in the West, enabling the United States and Europe to act swiftly in taking apart the former Yugoslavia. Germany wanted Slovenia and Croatia to achieve independence from Yugoslavia, and its wish was granted.

The United States wanted Bosnia to separate from Yugoslavia, and that wish was also granted. Disintegration and war in the former Yugoslavia was caused mainly by the
hasty and reckless Western policy of recognizing new states from entities seeking secession from an existing state. Indeed, the Western powers dismembered Yugoslavia through a new method of aggression: diplomatic recognition. The U.S. and Germany would argue that “Serbian nationalism” was to blame for the collapse of Yugoslavia, and that they were merely recognizing the reality of a disintegrating federation. This does not explain, however, why they were unwilling to recognize the reality that Bosnia had fallen apart even before it came into existence as a functioning state.

Yugoslavia was taken apart so radically due to the sudden lack of countervailing power following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which enabled the West to act in violation of the 1975 Helsinki Agreements guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the existing states in Europe. When powerful states, acting in unison in a unipolar world, choose to take apart another state through the instrument of diplomatic recognition, there seems to be no defense or deterrence. With Russia weak and helpless, the Helsinki principles did not stop Germany and the U.S. from redrawing the boundaries of Yugoslavia against the wishes of the Serbs.

Under the conditions of the Cold War and a global bipolar balance of power, Western actions in the former Yugoslavia might have met with Soviet and even Chinese opposition, and such actions could have been blocked through vetoes in the Security Council. But perhaps an argument can be made that the tragedy of Yugoslavia was an isolated case, caused by an error of Western judgment. There are disturbing examples, though, which indicate that—if left unchecked—the U.S. will do the same elsewhere.

**NATO: An Alliance or a Collective Security Pact?**

NATO was originally an alliance system created to counter the military threat of the Warsaw Pact countries. The relevant section of NATO’s basic purpose statement reads as follows: “It provides deterrence against any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state. It preserves the strategic balance within Europe” (italics added). When communist rule ended in Europe and the Warsaw Pact was dismantled, these rationales for NATO’s existence also ended. A commonly perceived external enemy is, after all, the main reason for forging an alliance, not a vague eventuality that a powerful enemy may arise in some distant future. Without an enemy, there would not be sufficient consensus and motivation to keep the alliance together.

Maintaining an alliance in the absence of external threats may serve notice to nonmembers that the security interests of the allied countries will be protected. But a military alliance which does not face a countervailing military power may be seen as a threat to other states and could provoke them to seek appropriate counterbalancing measures. Thus, the rationale for NATO’s existence could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. At the moment there appears to be no other state or group of states capable of counterbalancing the military capabilities of NATO. As such, NATO constitutes a
standing provocation to the rest of the world, an alliance in search of an enemy in order to justify its existence. It is absurd to argue that a weak Russia should not feel threatened by an expanded NATO, a condition which the U.S. would not tolerate in reverse.

Today, NATO is the only military alliance left on earth. It is now obvious that Russia is to be excluded from this military “partnership,” and it may be compelled to rearm itself in the face of an expanded and more dangerous NATO threat—thus creating the enemy that NATO needs to justify its existence. Alternatively, NATO may be kept in reserve to serve as a counterweight to a potential combined military threat from Russia and China, a return to the early Cold War scenario of the 1950’s.

None of these possibilities, however, are mentioned in NATO objectives at the end of the Cold War. Instead, the *NATO Handbook* declares: “The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the unification of Germany in October 1990, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and dramatic changes elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, marked the end of the Cold War era….However, as events have proved, dangers to peace and threats to stability remain.” These new dangers were defined as “the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the violence taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and elsewhere.”

There were, of course, “the Serbs” (especially in Bosnia), whom the United States had declared to be the enemy. The debate in the U.S. Congress and in the media during much of the Bosnian crisis usually concerned when and how to bomb the Serbs, not whether or not to do so. An executive order issued by President Clinton on October 25, 1994, identified the Bosnian Serbs as the enemy of the United States and a threat to American national security! Thus, because of the civil war among Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, the U.S. government determined the Bosnian Serbs to be a threat to American national security, and presumably also to the survival of NATO. Why the Serbian effort to keep as many Serbs together as possible within the former Yugoslavia should provoke U.S. national security concerns is not clear.

Much of this U.S.-defined security threat to the U.S. and Europe was built around the Munich Syndrome and the domino theory. The lesson of the 1938 Munich experience was, apparently, that Serbian aggressors must not be appeased—otherwise it could lead to a wider war, perhaps even a third world war. Just as confusing was NATO’s involvement in the Bosnian civil war, engaging in air attacks on Serbian positions—the first such military action undertaken by NATO in its entire history. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Serbs, who fought on the Allied side in two world wars, were set up as the enemy of the NATO countries in a contrived and unconvincing effort to justify and prolong NATO’s existence. Until August 1996, NATO refrained from further bombing, mainly in order to avoid breaking up the alliance. With the U.S. and Germany promoting air strikes over British and French objections, the demise of NATO was a distinct possibility. Perhaps the old NATO is being turned into a regional collective security pact.
to deal with tensions within Europe and among the proposed members of the expanded
group. Until now, NATO has not been a collective security pact, and therefore a Turkish
attack on Greece would not have invited a NATO military response. If NATO were to
become a regional collective security pact, however, a Greek-Turkish war could invite a
NATO response against the side that initiated the attack.

The 1991 Gulf War experience, however, suggests that NATO has become the
military instrument of the U.N. collective security system, a U.N. that has come under the
domination of the United States. Thus, NATO today is either a dangerous alliance and a
threat to those countries outside its membership, or it is seeking a role as the military
enforcer of regional and global collective security organizations, the military arm of both
the European Union and of the United Nations.

If it is strictly a Western alliance, then NATO should be dismantled. Its members
face no external threats now that communism has collapsed. If it is a regional collective
security pact, NATO should be advised to confine its operations to threats faced by its
members from within, such as an attack by Greece or Turkey on the other. Such a role
would be within the terms of the U.N. Charter. On the other hand, if NATO becomes the
military enforcer of U.N. collective security, the credibility and impartiality of the U.N.
will be compromised. The U.N. would become nothing more than a representation of
U.S. and European dominance over the rest of the world.

None of the above objectives of NATO are clear in its military actions after the
end of the Cold War. The 1991 Western war against Iraq, using NATO firepower, was
ostensibly conducted to preserve the U.N. Charter’s principle of nonaggression, but the
real motives may have been Western strategic and economic interests. In fact, NATO has
no right to interfere in the former Yugoslavia, any more than in other civil wars raging in
Georgia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, or Liberia. But President Yeltsin can do little more than
declare that NATO is “trying to split the European continent again.”

The New U.S.-Dominated United Nations

U.S. military dominance, backed by the ability to threaten economic punishments
or to promise economic rewards to those who oppose or support American policies, has
changed the character of the United Nations. The U.N. system has been reduced to an
obedient organization of the United States—a return to the early years of the U.N. With
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact alliance, voting in the Security
Council is always unanimous or near-unanimous in favor of U.S. policies. States with
veto powers, including Russia and China, have rarely ventured to veto U.S.-sponsored or
U.S.-supported U.N. resolutions. If there are no explicit U.S. military threats against
states who oppose U.S.-supported U.N. resolutions, there may be perceptions of implicit
U.S. economic punishments and rewards.
There were no negative votes in the Security Council on a series of resolutions—
sponsored by the U.S. and its new Muslim and Third World “allies” in the Security
Council and General Assembly—concerning the civil war in the former Yugoslavia,
despite serious reservations by some members. In late 1994, after expressing some
misgivings, Russia finally vetoed a Security Council resolution, sponsored by the U.S., to
place an embargo on the shipment of Serbian oil to the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.

Consider U.S. actions at the U.N. in November 1994 alone. When the U.S. sought
to lift the arms embargo in order to enable arms to flow to the Muslims in the Bosnian
civil war, it appeared that four vetoes might be cast by the remaining four permanent
members of the Security Council. But that never happened, despite all of the informal
disagreements that were expressed. No state now wishes to oppose or offend the U.S.

States either cannot afford to alienate the U.S. for economic or strategic reasons,
or they do not sufficiently care about the Balkans to act on their beliefs. However, to
avoid embarrassing the other permanent members of the Security Council (all of which
were opposed to the lifting of the arms embargo), the U.S. took its case to the General
Assembly. Its non-binding resolution was passed, with 97 votes in favor and 61
abstentions, and without a single negative vote being cast. Surely, every one of those 61
countries who abstained disagreed with the U.N. resolution in varying degrees, and yet
none dared or cared to vote against the U.S.

If such U.N. voting patterns were to occur within any country that claimed to be
free and democratic, they would invite skepticism and derision about freedom of
expression in, and the democratic character of, that state. Even more brazen, the U.S.—
despite the prevailing U.N. arms embargo—knowingly allowed an abundance of arms to
flow to Croatia and Bosnia. U.S. military personnel in Bosnia provided training in tactical
operations, comprehensive satellite intelligence showing Serb positions, and air traffic
control. Meanwhile, Croatia was building or assembling everything from tanks to MiG-
21 combat aircraft, and was channeling a “flood of weapons” to Bosnia. According to an
need, I get.” Most of these arms came from the Middle East—including from Iran, which
the U.S. has declared to be a terrorist state. The U.S. went further in ignoring the arms
embargo by refusing to monitor shipments through the Adriatic, arguing that inaction did
not amount to a violation of the U.N. resolution.

A clear demonstration that “what the U.S. wants, it gets” may be seen in the
American effort to prevent Boutros Boutros-Ghali from seeking a second term as
Secretary General. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. (and now Secretary of State) Madeleine
Albright carried a personal dislike and antagonism towards Boutros-Ghali. She wished to
replace him with a Ghanian, Kofi Anan. Fourteen out of 15 members of the Security
Council voted in November 1996 to renew Boutros-Ghali’s term. The U.S. vetoed
Boutros-Ghali’s appointment, and eventually its man was appointed.
This kind of behavior by a dominant individual, group, corporation, or state is perhaps inevitable. Even if it acts benevolently in most situations, the dominant actor will insist on exceptions in pursuit of its objectives, even to the point of violating international law and justice. International law apparently does not apply to the United States if it does not agree with decisions which run counter to U.S. policy goals.

Moral Principles and Immoral Consequences

There is a fundamental problem with the current U.S.-determined moral high ground. The U.S. faces no serious risk to American lives or property should it decide to use military force in places such as Iraq, Libya, or Bosnia. Since the financial costs of American military operations may be paid for by other states, as in the Gulf War, the U.S. may now possess the luxury of being able to emphasize moral principles while disregarding any immoral consequences of its military actions and economic sanctions.

The U.S. has decided that, in the post-Cold War era, it will be the author and underwriter of the world’s moral principles, and that NATO will enforce those moral principles, especially if violations affect the strategic and economic interests of the U.S. and the West. The U.S. also considers it morally justifiable to punish whole nations through strategic bombing and devastating economic sanctions, even when its interests are not immediately involved. However, the enforcement of American values and principles is uneven and indiscriminate, as in the case of Afghanistan, where conditions were even worse than in Bosnia.

The Afghan tragedy was created by the CIA and the KGB. Afghans of all ethnic backgrounds continue to pay a heavy price after the Soviet military withdrawal and the consequent loss of American interest in their fate. Like the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks fight and kill each other in Afghanistan. Like Sarajevo, Kabul was continually shelled by the Pashtun forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (armed by the CIA). Thousands of Afghan civilians were killed, and Kabul was razed to the ground. Like Bosnia between 1992 and 1996, Afghanistan was not a functioning state. In Afghanistan, however, Western strategic interests disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similar wars of secession, civil wars, and massacres—such as those in Turkey, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Cambodia—attract no parallel American or Western moral or military response to end the bloodshed.

The Kantian approach of acting on moral principles rather than assessing the immoral consequences of one’s actions would appear to be a quintessentially American way of thinking. On the other hand, Europeans (especially the British and the French), tend to be more like Benthamite utilitarians. European powers may be promote their self-interest, but they also push policies that are based on pragmatism rather than on noble and unworkable principles. They prefer to seek solutions that minimize overall damage rather
than enforce moral principles whatever the human cost. Admittedly, the difference is one of degree, since both are concerned with national interests and damage limitation, but this difference in degree may be crucial in crisis management.

The American moral principle appears to be that, if civilians are killed through collateral damage, the pain and suffering inflicted should not affect our conscience too badly. There is supposed to be a moral difference between killing many innocent people the “right way,” and killing a few people the “wrong way.” The bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong by American warplanes—resulting in the deaths of thousands of Vietnamese civilians—was considered morally acceptable, but the killings of a few hundred Vietnamese civilians at My Lai by Lt. William Calley was deemed to be mass murder.

This American attitude is best exemplified by the new U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. During an appearance by Albright on the CBS news program 60 Minutes (May 12, 1996) while she was still U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., news correspondent Lesley Stahl asked her: “We have heard that half a million children have died [as a result of the post-Gulf War sanctions on Iraq]. I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima. And you know, is the price worth it?” Albright responded: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, is worth it.”

Even though Americans have not fought a war at home since the Civil War, they did pay a heavy price in two world wars, and in the Korean and Vietnam wars. Now even that has changed. What is troublesome now is that there will no more “Vietnams.” Instead, there will be more “Iraqs” and “Bosnias,” in which American lives will not be at stake. Americans will no longer be asked to risk death but will inflict death on others through advanced high-tech weapons. Wars are to be pursued by a U.S.-led NATO for moral principles, while the costs of the death and destruction inflicted on other ethnic groups, nations, and states are likely to be paid for by Brunei, Japan, Taiwan, and rich Arab countries. Military enforcement or economic sanctions will be conducted against predefined “rogue” states and “thug” regimes, with no risk to the lives of the moral enforcers or to their economic comfort and wellbeing at home. And ultimately it will be a case—as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq—of “destroy and forget.”

Criticizing the muddle of U.S. military and moral policies in the post-Cold War era may be easy enough. But are there viable and feasible alternatives to the promotion of global security and moral values that are not those of the dominant power? NATO has no further purpose as an alliance, but not only are excuses being sought to keep NATO going, flimsy rationalizations are being advanced to expand it. NATO’s expansion will be destabilizing, since it will pose a standing threat to those states which are not its members. While NATO may serve as a regional security pact for its own members, it should be discouraged from acting beyond the boundaries of its member states unless developments outside those boundaries pose an immediate and direct threat to its members. More importantly, NATO remains an alliance without a predetermined
threat, but one intent on finding or creating that threat. The best candidate thus far to fill this vacancy of “designated enemy” is Russia, whose apparent innate imperialistic and aggressive characteristics are pointed out constantly by the U.S. media. And aiding and abetting Russia will be “the Serbs,” whom the American media remind us repeatedly are the “traditional ally” of Russia. As long as NATO remains intact as an alliance system, enemies must be found to rationalize its existence.

When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, resisted U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright’s demands to bomb the Serbs, Albright reportedly responded: “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” Contrast this with the wisdom of Sun Tzu in his *The Art of War*, written some 2,500 years ago: “Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” The world could hardly be safe with an expanded NATO, especially with Mrs. Albright directing it and obtaining more mandates from a pliant U.N.

In the former Yugoslavia, the use of military force by NATO through authorizations provided by U.N.-appointed commanders should have served as the model for future actions. The peace settlement enforced in 1995 by NATO military power was in no way morally superior to that which the Serbs were about to accomplish in their favor, viz., a territorial settlement uniting most Serbs into a single state.

As the dominant world power, the U.S. should avoid bullying other states into acceptance of its security and moral agenda through threats of economic punishments and military actions, or promises of economic rewards. The need for American “leadership” does not mean that the U.S. must make and dictate policy to its allies and friends. The American media and American politicians have concluded that Bill Clinton’s failure to get the U.N. and the European powers to adopt the U.S. line on Bosnia shows a lack of leadership. Real leadership, apparently, was exhibited by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, who bombed Libya and Iraq in defense of American principles and in pursuit of the American dream.

The realist Hans Morgenthau admonished that “diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit. This is the first of the rules that diplomacy can neglect only at the risk of war.” Historically, the problem has been that dominant powers or alliance systems always think that what is best for them is best for the region or the world they dominate. Such attitudes prevailed in the British and French imperial systems, in the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America until World War II, and even in American policy during the Cold War. The same attitude exists today among leaders of the United States and some members of NATO. Even if not overtly stated, the implicit belief exists that the “New World Order” must conform to what the U.S. considers most desirable.
In such conditions, dominant powers define and dictate the conditions of peace and stability, and argue that their terms are also fair and just. Centuries ago, Machiavelli declared that morality is the product of power. Although sometimes condemned for simply stating what is, rather than pontificating about what ought to be, he has given his name to the tenet that the powerful determine what is right or wrong, just or unjust. British historian E.H. Carr once pointed out that dominant powers have usually assumed that they are the guardians or trustees of world law and order. But, according to Carr, this moral high ground was usually nothing more than “the transparent disguises of selfish vested interests.” The problem we face on the threshold of the new century is clear: should the dominant power or alliance act unjustly, as it has chosen to do in the Balkans in the 1990’s, or should it commit aggression, there will be no other state or organization to check it, or to stop—much less reverse—its aggression.

As the dominant state in the post-Cold War era, it is not necessary for America to seek to resolve all of the world’s conflicts, or to run the world’s security system. There are few issues that do not carry with them historic and current complexities. There are usually claims and grievances on all sides. The United States is no more capable than any previous great power of resolving these painful issues by dictating simple formulas, terms, and conditions to warring factions, let alone by conducting war against the designated enemy faction. Being the world’s sole military and economic superpower does not endow the United States with all-pervasive knowledge, or superior wisdom and judgment.
New Cops on the Block

Scott P. Richert

“Well,” said Sam Donaldson on the former This Week With David Brinkley last February 23, “how many foreign languages do you speak?” “Five,” replied the new U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. “Well, four; depends on whether you count English as a foreign language. I guess it is to me.”

We all know that Madeleine Albright is a naturalized citizen, born in Czechoslovakia, and that her first language was either Czech or German, but certainly not English. For the third time in a mere quarter of a century, a President of the United States has turned to a naturalized citizen to determine the course of our foreign affairs, but despite their heavy accents and frequent abuse of the English language, I doubt that either Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski would have referred almost instinctively to English as a foreign language.

To Mrs. Albright, however, the language of the United States remains a foreign tongue. This episode could serve as an allegory for the entire defense team that Clinton has chosen for his second term. Strangers in a strange land, they are the “new cops on the block,” ready to prove their worth by any means necessary.

Senator William Cohen, the Secretary of Defense, never served in the military, but the New York Times has uncovered his secret qualification for the job: according to an article from January 23, 1997, he has a “taste for leather bomber jackets when visiting military bases.” During his confirmation hearing Cohen made much of his policy disagreements with the administration, singling out American intervention in the Balkans as an example. But his disagreements followed the conventional GOP line: he never criticized the President for intervening, nor for any of the American bombings. The GOP leadership has consistently been more hawkish than the President, calling for intervention earlier and on a larger scale. After the United States did step in, GOP criticism was confined to faulting the administration for not establishing an “exit strategy” for American troops, and it was that line that Cohen followed when he stated at his confirmation hearings that, with him at the helm of the Defense Department, the United States would not “make an unlimited commitment to that region.”

While Madeleine Albright seems willing to intervene anywhere she can get away with it, she seems to have a special fondness for (or a pathological obsession with) the Balkans. Even if it wasn’t spelled out when he was offered the job, Cohen knows full well what the administration expects from him, and in 1998, when American troops are supposed to leave the Balkans, he’ll blithely explain to Congress and the country why he
was wrong and Clinton and Albright are right. He has already proved his willingness to play the token Republican, providing cover while the President calls for bipartisanship (read, “one-party-ship”) and proclaims that some of his best friends are Republicans.

But while Cohen may have been picked in part for his eventual usefulness on the Balkans, on one important issue—the use of the military as a laboratory for social reconstruction—he is clearly in line with Bill Clinton. He supports the “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy on homosexuals in the military. He believes in the complete integration of women into the Armed Forces, even in combat situations. And just in case such integration leads to another “Love Boat,” such as the Navy ship in the Persian Gulf on which ten percent of the female sailors mysteriously became pregnant, he supports performing abortions in military facilities, at taxpayer expense.

Unlike Cohen, Anthony Lake, Clinton’s first choice for director of the CIA, has been around the block a time or two. His career in public service began when he arrived in Saigon with the Foreign Service in 1963 as an aide to Henry Cabot Lodge, at the very time Lodge was conspiring with the CIA to arrange the assassination of our ally, Diem. During Clinton’s first term, Lake served as National Security Advisor, a post that his deputy, Samuel Berger, has inherited. He is the person most responsible for the administration’s cover-up of its Iran-Bosnia policy, and Lake admitted lying to both Congress and the CIA about the efforts to arm the Bosnian Muslims. While that admission should have been enough to prevent him from becoming CIA director, it was ultimately his involvement in the White House’s Chinese fundraising scandal that forced him to withdraw his nomination. But his legacy will live on. At Lake’s urging, President Clinton has nominated George Tenet, the acting director of the CIA, as the permanent director of the agency. Tenet served as Lake’s aide for intelligence matters at the National Security Council from 1993 until 1995. With Tenet at CIA and Berger at NSC, Lake’s protégés will control most of the country’s intelligence resources.

But if William Cohen is the willing dupe, set up to take the fall, and Lake’s protégés will provide the “noble lie” on which to found the Clinton administration’s version of the “New World Order,” it’s clear that the new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, will be the one to wield the nightstick. Bill Clinton likes his women to be men, and in Mrs. Albright, he’s found someone who can outmatch both Hillary and Janet Reno. When the First Lady rhapsodizes about the welfare of children, she exhibits some feminine and maternal feeling (albeit severely misplaced); Secretary Albright is too tough for that.

When the butcher of Mount Carmel sent 82 people—18 of them children under the age of 10—to their deaths, she claimed that she did it to protect those very children from child abuse, a fate apparently worse than death itself. By contrast, Mrs. Albright, when asked on 60 Minutes (May 12, 1996) about the deaths of a half-million Iraqi
children resulting from American sanctions after the Gulf War, exhibited no compunction: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, is worth it.”

It is that attitude which led Owen Harries, the editor of the *National Interest*, to declare in a *New York Times* editorial that Albright, “More than any other leading foreign policy player since the end of the cold war…epitomizes a belief in the virtue of uninhibited American interventionism.” And it’s that attitude which provoked her infamous confrontation with Colin Powell, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which she demanded to know, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”

While Harries took her question to mean that Albright doesn’t understand the concept of military deterrence, there’s a more fundamental problem. American troops have been deployed—just in this decade—in Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Macedonia, the straits of Taiwan, Rwanda, and Zaire—to say nothing of our continued military presence in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Okinawa, along the border of a divided Korea, and in the middle of a united Germany. But for Secretary Albright, this is not enough. What, then, would constitute a reasonable level of use? Though we may shudder at the thought of Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State, perhaps we should offer a prayer of gratitude that Bill Clinton didn’t tap her as Secretary of Defense.

By now, everyone—even Albright herself—knows that the mayor of Letohrad, her hometown in Czechoslovakia, sent her a message, through diplomatic channels, in February 1994, informing her of the fact that her grandparents had died in Nazi concentration camps. The American media gushed over the wrenching human drama of Albright “discovering” her Jewish roots, but out of either stupidity or collusion, they’ve overlooked strong evidence, hidden in plain sight, that both Albright and the administration knew the truth. A series of White House press releases concerning Albright, all of which can be found on the official White House web site, tells the story.

From the time of Albright’s appointment as ambassador to the U.N., through December 5, 1996, when she was appointed Secretary of State, the White House press releases mention that her family fled from “Hitler” or “Nazi aggression.” (Sometimes, though not always, they also state that her family fled from “Stalin.”) The press releases also say that her family came to America to find, not just freedom, but “tolerance.”

Of course, Secretary Albright’s ethnicity should have had no bearing on her confirmation hearings, nor should it affect her ability to perform her duties as Secretary of State. But in light of Albright’s (almost certainly) deliberate deception about her past, it is ironic that she demanded in February that the reporting on government-run television in Serbia become “more objective.”

While President Milosevic was clearly using the state-run stations for propaganda purposes, who are we to talk? The supposedly free media in the United States have
spouted the Clinton administration’s propaganda about the Balkans as faithfully as they did the Bush administration’s propaganda about the Gulf War. Apparently, to paraphrase Mrs. Albright’s statement on “war crimes,” “the U.S. Government does not believe that because some propaganda may go unexposed, all must.” The determination of which propaganda is acceptable, like the determination of which “war crimes” will be punished, is left to the American government, and to Mrs. Albright.

But even Mrs. Albright, normally a persuasive speaker, can’t bring herself to lie convincingly when discussing the Markale marketplace massacre of February 1994: “It’s very hard to believe any country would do this to their own people, and therefore, although we do not exactly know what the facts are, it would seem to us that the Serbs are the ones that probably have a great deal of responsibility.” (“Senior official admits to secret U.N. report on the Sarajevo massacre,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 6, 1996).

Of course, her remarks were only reported overseas, and for most American journalists anything that’s not reported in English never occurred. If Albright can ensure that her tepid lies stay out of the American media, the administration’s propaganda campaign will continue to succeed.

Albright’s dedication to military intervention may be outweighed only by her zeal for “family planning” (or more properly, “family banning”) as a tool of American foreign policy. It is appropriate, then, that her first public appearance on Capitol Hill as Secretary of State focused on contraceptive imperialism, and that her first trip abroad ended in Beijing, site of the infamous United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women, and home to the world’s most enlightened regime on matters of family planning. In her appearance on Capitol Hill, Albright argued that the United States could demonstrate its “world leadership” by leading the contraceptive charge. “One of the most important ways we contribute to sustainable development is through our support for international family planning…Moreover, our voluntary family-planning programs serve our broader interests by elevating the status of women, reducing the flow of refugees, protecting the environment and promoting economic growth.”

Perhaps Secretary Albright can combine her two passions by using our underutilized military (under U.N. command, of course) to “elevat[e] the status of women” by forcing them to abort their children, have their tubes tied, or submit to IUD insertion. After all, what more noble cause could a refugee from the Nazis take up than the protection of America from the dark, unwashed hordes of the Third World?

Lest anyone think that the preceding remarks are in jest, consider this: from the American perspective, there would be no “Serbian problem” in the Balkans if there were no Serbs. Bombing can be rather expensive; combat on the ground can get too involved, and may provoke a backlash at home; and U.N. concentration camps are too bold a move—at least for now. But if the new cops on the block thought that a combination of force
and persuasion could convince the Serbs to commit ethnic suicide through pills and IUDs, does anyone really believe that they would not try?

The new cops on the block are walking their beat now, but it would be a mistake for Americans to expect them to protect our interests, and an even greater mistake for those in other countries to expect them to act with justice. The new Clinton defense team has no desire to act like good cops should—upholding the law so that freedom may flourish. They’re not even willing to act like cops on the take, for that would mean submitting their will to someone else’s. No, these new cops on the block are the international arm of the domestic phenomenon that Samuel Francis has called “anarcho-tyranny.” Loyal to nothing and to no one—not to their ethnic background, their political party, certainly not to the Constitution they have sworn to uphold and defend—they are motivated by a raw will to power. And like their soulmates in the FBI and the BATF, there will be no stopping them when they decide to break down a few doors and to bust a few heads.
The (New) Ugly American

Joseph Sobran

The regime we live under—that of the United States Constitution—began with a set of clear understandings. One was that the federal government was to be the servant of the people. It was to be confined to the specific powers the people “delegated” to it, pursuant to the general welfare and common defense of the United States. If it exercised powers the people had not delegated to it, it was “usurping” power and committing “tyranny.” A federal government was, of course, a compact among the sovereign states, as opposed to a “consolidated” or centralized government that was itself sovereign.

Few Americans understand this kind of talk today. Words like “delegated” and “consolidated” are known only to people who set out to build more powerful vocabularies. You can hardly explain the difference between “federal” and “consolidated” government to the products of modern American education, because when they hear the word “federal,” they assume it means the same thing our ancestors meant by “consolidated.” For all practical purposes, “federal” is just a fancy synonym for “big.”

The idea of restricting government to “enumerated” powers—a written and finite list—is equally alien to today’s American. The only remedies he can think of for big government are term limits and a balanced budget amendment. The lucid and shared philosophy of the Founding Fathers, imperfect as it was, has also become unintelligible to today’s American, who knows only a set of slogans labeled “liberal,” “conservative,” and “moderate.” Of course there are wide areas of consensus; if you are outside those areas, you are an “extremist.”

One of the things we can all agree on—unless we are extremists—is that America has a mission abroad: “world leadership.” Both parties and all stripes of pundits agree on that. We must lead the “international community” in keeping peace, deterring “terrorism,” and securing “human rights.” Along with these lofty goals, we must defend our “vital interests” around the world. To deny this part of the new American creed is to be labeled an “isolationist.” We must never forget “the lesson of Munich,” which our Secretary of State considers her formative lesson, as opposed to what some people call “the lesson of Vietnam,” or what might be called “the lesson of Sarajevo.” Isolationism led to World War II. Never mind what led to World War I.

But World War II, even more than the Civil War, remains the holy war of the American establishment—the event that gave legitimacy to arrangements of power
absolutely opposed to the arrangements established by the Constitution. It not only completed the consolidation of domestic power in Washington, but turned Washington into the capital of an enormous empire, which itself consolidated during the Cold War. Of course consolidation is never quite complete, and though there are no more worlds to conquer, there are still a few parts of the world we have not fully subdued.

Americans do not like words like “conquest” and “empire,” so these terms are not part of the official vocabulary. After all, our rulers led us into war by telling us that the Kaiser, Hitler, the Japanese, and the Soviets were bent on “world conquest.” So we speak of “leadership,” “defense,” and “promoting democracy.” Everything we do, everywhere, is “defense.” Even the Department of War has been rechristened the Department of Defense. American military action is now defensive by definition. No matter how many troops we place abroad, no matter how far from home, no matter how many people we kill in their own homelands with advanced weaponry they cannot hope to match or resist, we are merely “defending” ourselves. Why can’t those foreigners understand this?

It is odd that we attach such opprobrium to “isolationism.” We Americans are a psychically isolated people who, in our dealings with the rest of the world, are peculiarly uninterested in other people. We have very little curiosity about how the world looks from other places. When we fight a war, we do not even ask ourselves why there is another side. That may have something to do with why we are becoming so widely hated—a fact that seems to surprise us.

On the one hand, we are told that military intervention abroad is in our “national interest.” But if we conclude, after weighing costs and benefits, that intervention is actually against our interests, we are accused of “isolationism” for failing to support it anyway. It seems that intervention is our duty, no matter what it costs us. We have come a long way from “the common defense of the United States.” This originally meant that if one of the 13 states were attacked by a foreign power, the other states would consider themselves under attack too, and act accordingly.

Foreign policy is a lot less literal-minded than it used to be. Who knows what “vital interests” are? We are told that our “vital interests” are at stake everywhere in the world. George Bush specified Iraq, but never explained why—or rather, explained too often: the reasons Bush gave for the war included the evil of aggression, oil, and “jobs.”

To be literal-minded about it, a “vital interest” is one on which your survival depends. In that sense, the survival of the United States has never been threatened except by Russian missiles, which came into existence, ironically, because of the United States entry into World War II on the Soviet side.

Switzerland has recently faced what some people have called its greatest foreign policy crisis since World War II: the demand for the return of Nazi-confiscated wealth, deposited in Swiss banks, to its rightful owners. If this is its worst crisis over the last half-

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century, one can only envy Switzerland. That little country is also under renewed attack for having stayed out of the war. Yet it is none the worse for wear for its notorious neutrality; it spared the lives of tens of thousands of its sons. You might think it deserves some credit, or at least human consideration, for that. But one hardly dares to ask in public: Why should the Swiss have fought? Apparently the Swiss government actually identified its national interest with the good of its people. Whatever others may say, I honor Switzerland for keeping its sanity. It remains a serenely civilized country. But of course we seldom ask whether the Swiss may know something we do not.

Today the American government is still looking for trouble. It is currently trying to expand NATO to include countries bordering on Russia, but not Russia itself; and Mrs. Albright has tried to explain to the Russians that this policy is not anti-Russian. Certainly not. No more than it would be anti-American for the Russians to form a military alliance with Canada and Mexico, and to place troops on our borders. Again our rulers show the American trait of incomprehension of other perspectives. Russia is still a potentially dangerous country, with a huge nuclear arsenal. What on earth is gained by provoking it now? Its communist ideology is dead; its problems are local and internal; it has no natural reason to be our enemy anymore.

I used to try to understand the sophisticated rationale for American foreign policy that I was sure existed. It took a long time for the truth to dawn on me: American foreign policy is an insult to the intelligence. Yes, highly sophisticated people try to shape it, and some of their machinations and rationalizations are extremely clever; I’ll give Henry Kissinger that much. But it is as futile to seek integrated rationality in American foreign policy as to seek it in our government’s domestic policy. Both are chaotic. If they have a common denominator, it is the habit of accumulating power, of starting and continuing on risky and expensive courses whose final consequences no man can foresee.

Whether your literary taste runs to Hayek or Hamlet, the lesson is the same: the future cannot be controlled. Michael Oakeshott has shown the inherent futility of “rationalism in politics.” Rationalism of the kind Oakeshott described may be discredited in domestic politics—socialism is a dead ideology—but it survives in the current attempt to build a “New World Order” through international conferences, treaties, paper currencies, trade agreements, and the like, along with sporadic military intervention of the kind the United States has engaged in from Haiti to Somalia to Bosnia to Iraq.

I yield to nobody in my contempt for our news media, which do their best to support the ruling elite. Far from a critical “adversary press,” we rely for information on a courtier press that wants to be part of the action and shape public policy—an ambition that corrupts the avowed purpose of keeping us informed. And yet, for all its faults, the press, including television, tells us more than it intends to. Anyone who watches carefully will lose any awe, or even trust, he once felt for our rulers.
They relentlessly expose themselves as venal, small-minded power-seekers to whom it is sheer madness to entrust our fate. No amount of favorable press coverage can conceal that. Our Presidents, our justices, our congressmen are made of the same stuff: Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Newt Gingrich—I’m starting at the top of the line of succession—Ted Kennedy, Al D’Amato, Pat Schroeder, Barney Frank…but why go on? These may be among the worst; but who are the best? Is there anyone in public life today you really admire? More to the point, do you trust the aggregate of these people to send our sons abroad to fight in worthy causes? We cannot even trust them to keep their hands out of the till. As for acting on any noble or honorable public philosophy, the idea is ludicrous. There is no point in debating principles with such people, any more than with a Mafia don.

But our current rulers are the natural residue of a long history. A country that has chosen such “great” leaders as Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt has pretty well decided that its future Jeffersons will have to find occupations outside politics: a centralized welfare state operating a global empire has closed off Jeffersonian options. How many Johnsons, Nixons, and Clintons do we have to endure before we realize that they are not anomalies? Who is fitter than Bill Clinton to lead this kind of country at the pinnacle of “world leadership”?

Such is the “leader of the free world.” We have produced a system that guarantees that men like him will rise to the top. It is bad enough that they exercise enormous leverage over a quarter of a billion people within our borders; it is horrifying that they should exert similar impact on the rest of mankind. We should feel disgust for our rulers, but they are by no means the worst feature of American society today. American culture itself is now so completely degraded—so self-evidently foul—that we can only be embarrassed and shamed by its global influence. One feels that it should be placed under some sort of international quarantine.

Our rulers and cultural leaders share one remarkable trait: they are seriously alienated from Christian culture. They consider it a positive virtue and duty to uproot popular Christian traditions. The recent movie *The People vs. Larry Flint* celebrates a pornographer and the Supreme Court decision that “expanded our First Amendment freedoms.” The partnership of a pornographer (who himself is oddly like our President) and the judiciary aptly symbolizes our decline.

Conservatives rail against the courts for their support of such evils as pornography and abortion, but it is not just the content of recent jurisprudence that matters. It is that the federal judiciary has been part of the broader assault on federalism. We are taught that the Supreme Court furnishes a check on the other two branches of the federal government. But nearly all of its important decisions over the past half-century have overturned state, not federal laws. Far from checking federal usurpations of power, the Supreme Court has played a vital role in the whole campaign of usurpation. In the name
of separating church and state (according to a fraudulent interpretation of the First Amendment), it has de-Christianized America at the state and local levels. Its message to every town in the country is that it may not rule itself according to its most sacred traditions. In acting thus, the Court is not merely “legislating,” as its accusers say; even more important, it is centralizing power in the name of the Constitution that was supposed to protect us against “consolidated” government.

The Court’s critics are closer to the mark when they speak of the “imperial” judiciary—but the judiciary does not aspire to independent power; it supports the Washington-based empire by weakening all other centers of power that once constituted the federal system. The federal judiciary is actually anti-federal. Because traditional popular culture is, or was, deeply Christian, the country could only be de-Christianized by edict from a single center of power, preferably by unelected officials. This role was quietly assigned to the judicial branch, which has nothing to fear from the voters.

Meanwhile, American influence abroad has also made war on local cultures and traditions. Commercial movies and music have insulted sexual morality, and foreign “aid,” including subsidies to population-control groups like Planned Parenthood, have promoted contraception and abortion, in defiance of local religious codes and deep-rooted mores. It is by no means only America’s support for Israel that causes Muslims to feel that this country is making war on Islam. Only in Bosnia has the United States taken the side of Muslims—perhaps because their enemy, this time, is Christian.

When local populations fight back with the only weapons available to poor people who lack advanced weaponry, our rulers and their courtier journalists damn and dismiss this reaction as “terrorism” and “anti-Americanism”—the counterpart of the “extremism” of those Americans who also see the American government as their deadly enemy.

Unfortunately, our government specializes in making enemies, at home and abroad. As George Washington said, government is not reason or persuasion, it is force. The bigger it grows, the more it is forcing or forbidding people to do things against their will—whether they are taxpayers, worshippers, businessmen, or cigarette smokers. And the more it does such things, the more it pits itself against those it rules. Eventually it reaches a point of essential alienation, where it can no longer pretend to represent the governed.

The American government is now the most powerful human organization that has ever existed. It has made a stupid habit of exercising power arbitrarily, uninhibited by moral or constitutional principle. It is not a conspiracy masterminded by some cunning genius at the center; it is a system of power which large numbers of greedy and ambitious people have learned to use. It has ceased to be a problem for Americans only; it has become a problem for a large part of the human race.
Last summer the neoconservative magazine the *Weekly Standard* ran a cover story attacking Bill Clinton’s foreign policy under the title “Is This Any Way to Run a Planet?” Running a planet! Clinton’s foreign policy, you see, was *insufficiently interventionist* for the *Standard*. And in February it ran a whole issue on the menace posed by China (just before the death of Deng Xiaoping, as it happened). Its lead editorial noted with alarm that China is increasing its “defense” spending. Well, one might ask, why *shouldn’t* China defend itself? But obviously the writer meant to imply that China has aggressive designs, and out of long habit he used the word “defense” in the American style, in which all military spending is called “defensive.”

The same editorial went on to accuse China of wanting to replace the United States as “the dominant power in East Asia…and the world.” I wondered if the *Standard* assumes stupidity in its readers, or merely reflexive agreement. Why *should* the United States dominate either East Asia or the world? And at what cost and risk? Such questions are not to be asked. Nor is the question whether American hegemony over the whole world is morally right or desirable.

Lately the *Standard* and other neoconservative tracts have also sounded an alarm against “anti-Americanism”—among American conservatives who have finally recognized their own government as their enemy. Apparently the American government is entitled to our unconditional love. Soon, no doubt, the neoconservatives will be accusing the conservatives of giving their loyalty to a foreign power. But the Founders of this country would not recognize the present government as their creation. We need not idealize them in order to recognize that the regime we live under now has severed any real connection with the original Republic, with its principles, its political culture, its love of peace and good relations abroad free of “entangling alliances.”

At home and abroad, this government has wildly outrun any possible rationale for its power. It is something every American should be both afraid of and ashamed of. A patriotic American today ought to be “anti-American.”
I know it will strike many people as odd to call the current foreign policy of the United States a form of “empire building” or “imperialism,” and of course none of our leaders would ever call it that. They would prefer some such term as “peacekeeping” or “spreading democracy” or “nation-building” or “exporting capitalism,” or some other euphemism. Frankly, it would be refreshing, whatever we think about imperialism in general or our current policies in particular, if someone had the integrity of Vergil, who openly acknowledged Rome’s imperial mission in the sixth book of the *Aeneid*. As John Dryden translated the passage,

But Rome, ‘tis thine alone, with awful sway,
To rule mankind and make the world obey,
Disposing peace and war thy own majestic way.
To tame the proud, the fettered slave to free—
These are imperial arts, and worthy thee.

Or to invoke the imperial mission as frankly as Rudyard Kipling did in his famous lines, “Take up the white man’s burden, / Send out the best ye breed; / Go, bind your sons to exile, / To serve your captives’ need.” At least, if we cannot have such exhortations to conquer and subdue even as we liberate and serve, we might have imperialism as an English schoolboy once defined it on his examination paper, according to a story told by the historian Sir Lewis Namier. Imperialism, wrote the budding proconsul, is simply “learning to get along with one’s social inferiors.”

But unfortunately today we are not even permitted such open acknowledgments of our imperial mission, let alone the domestic price such a mission almost always involves. A war justifiable only on the basis of protecting the stability of our authoritarian client states in the Persian Gulf is justified by promises of punishing Iraqi aggression and war crimes and of building democracy in what remains today, as it was before 1990, the kumquat despotism of Kuwait. Military intervention in Somalia is justified on the grounds of feeding the people of that country, when it should have been obvious that it was first necessary to invent a Somali government to administer the food. The invasion of Haiti is justified by the slogans about building democracy in a country that has perhaps the finest traditions of political assassination in history. And our most recent adventure in empire-building in the Balkans is justified with only the thinnest reference to our national interest. How much more refreshing it would be if President Clinton simply announced, “No, we have no national interest in any of these places, there is no compelling reason to
go there or send troops there or assume commitments there or spend money there, but we
are going anyway because we have the power to do it and we want to exercise that
power.” That kind of honesty would indeed be a far cry from Vergil or Kipling, but at
least we would be admitting what we are doing.

Of course, we do not make such admissions for two reasons. First, other nations
would not like it if the United States openly acknowledged it was assuming a global
imperial role without the window dressing of humanitarianism and altruism; and,
secondly, because the American people would not like to hear that this is what they are
being asked to support. Americans, even after a century of “internationalism,”
“interventionism,” and crusades against one global villain after another, still do not want
to assume the price of empire, still do not willingly send out the best they breed or bind
their sons (and now their daughters) to exile without being told that there is some good
reason for doing so. To our imperialist friends, this reluctance to send our sons to die in
someone else’s wars, or refusal to spend our taxes on war, foreign aid, and the whole vast
bureaucracy that administers the imperial system, is narrowly selfish, but the fact is that
there are few better reasons to resist imperialism than what are called “narrowly selfish”
ones.

Yet if not wanting to be killed in someone else’s war or not wanting to spend your
money on it are not sufficiently persuasive reasons for resisting imperialism, there are
others, and all of them, the ultimate price tags of empire, can be summarized in the rule
that the rise of empire abroad invariably means the decline of self-government at home.
There are several dimensions to the inverse relationship between empire and self-
government, and the rest of what I have to say today will make the relationship clear.

How is it, then, that the rise of empire results in the decline of self-government,
and why is the inverse relationship between self-government and empire true? First, self-
government or republican government necessarily rests on an ideal of civic
independence, on the idea as well as the reality that the citizens of a republic are self-
sufficient, that they govern themselves personally and morally as well as politically. The
idea that the citizens should support themselves economically, should be able to defend
themselves, educate themselves, and discipline themselves, is closely connected to the
idea of public virtue, as historian Forrest McDonald explains in his book on the formation
of the Constitution, Novus Ordo Seclorum:

Public virtue entailed firmness, courage, endurance, industry, frugal
living, strength, and above all, unremitting devotion to the weal of the
public’s corporate self, the community of virtuous men. It was at once
individualistic and communal: individualistic in that no member of the
public could be dependent upon any other and still be reckoned a member
of the public; communal in that every man gave himself totally to the good
of the public as a whole. If public virtue declined, the republic declined, and if it declined too far, the republic died.

Now it should be seen at once that this essential characteristic of a republic, the independence or autonomy of its citizens, runs counter to what an empire requires. Alexis de Tocqueville, commenting in a famous passage of his *Democracy in America*, grasped the contradiction, although he expressed it in terms of the tension between the needs of foreign affairs (what he called “foreign politics”) and the characteristics of a democracy.

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient…a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of various obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy; and they are precisely the qualities by which a nation, like an individual, attains a dominant position.

Tocqueville’s passage sounds as though he was faulting democracy, and probably he was, but the incapacity of “democracy” to succeed at “foreign politics” is one of the former’s virtues. It is indeed difficult to discipline a self-governing people into “persevering in a fixed design” having to do with foreign affairs, for the simple reason that the people are going to have better things to do—raise their children, earn their livings, and attend to their own complicated and serious business and responsibilities. A self-governing people is simply too busy, as a rule, with the concerns of self-government to take much interest in other peoples’ business. Moreover, those who wish to persevere in foreign designs are unlikely in a republic to have sufficient power to make the people go along with them, nor can they, in a free society, induce the people to shut up about what they are up to long enough to keep it or its management secret. A self-governing people generally abhors secrecy in government and rightly distrusts it.

The only way, then, in which those intent upon “fixed designs” in foreign affairs, especially in the expansion of their power over other peoples, can succeed is by diminishing the degree of self-government in their own society. They must persuade the self-governing people that there is too much self-government going around, that the people themselves simply are not smart enough or well informed enough to deserve much say in such complicated matters as foreign policy, and that, just as war is too important to be left to the generals, so foreign affairs is just too important to be left to the people. This, of course, is precisely what the State Department and the foreign policy establishment in this country have been telling us ever since World War I and continue to tell us today. We hear it every time politicians and bureaucrats invoke “national security” to avoid
telling us what they have been up to or are planning to do, and every time an American
President intones that “politics stops at the water’s edge.”

Of course, politics does not stop at the water’s edge, unless we as a people are
willing to surrender a vast amount of control over what the government does in military,
foreign, economic, and intelligence affairs. Empire, in other words, or even a government
to which foreign intervention is continuously important, requires centralization—
centralization of authority, decision-making, and discussion—and sooner or later the
effort to institutionalize such centralization leads to the decline of self-government, which
requires the decentralization that accompanies civic independence.

Moreover, empire requires not only centralization of authority and decision-
making but also the inculcation of passivity into the population. Republican government,
by contrast, involves civic activism, and the early champions of republicanism in
European history were insistent on the virtues of the vita activa over the vita
contemplativa, the contemplative life, which is more consistent with monarchy.
Republican citizens must work at being free all the time. They have to go vote, but far
more important than voting is the immense amount of time they have to spend in
discussing public affairs and informing themselves about them, and even more time-
consuming is the actual participation of the citizen in public office or in public duties,
including military service. If we are not willing to undertake the burdens of such public
duties, then we can find others to undertake them for us, including having a professional
army protect us; but in that case we will no longer be a republic, and we may soon find
that the professional army is no longer our servant but our master.

Empire cannot deal with that kind of civic activism or with its close relative, civic
independence. Empire requires a population that is so passive it is ready to obey the
commands of the empire spontaneously, a population that really has no compelling duties
and responsibilities at home, nothing else to do with its time, and is ready to go serve in
the foreign legion or the U.N. army at a moment’s notice. The transition from a republic
to an empire requires a transition in the public ethic, from an ethic that upholds the ideal
of taking care of your own affairs, your own country, family, and community, to taking
care of someone else’s. That is the imperial ethic of the two quotations I read earlier from
Vergil and Kipling; it is your duty to “rule mankind and make the world obey,” your
responsibility “to tame the proud, the fettered slave to free,” your obligation to “bind your
sons to exile,” and not to serve your own needs but to “serve your captives’ need.”

You don’t want to do that, you say? But, if not us, who? If not now, when? Don’t
you realize that on the shores of Kuwait there’s a sea gull covered with oil that will die?
Do you actually think your life or your son’s life is worth more than the life of that sea
gull? Don’t you know that if we don’t liberate Kuwait, that sea gull and thousands like it
will die at the hands of the most evil dictator in history; that the Somalis will starve; the
Balkan war will erupt into World War III; they won’t have democracy in Haiti, and all
because you’re unwilling to sacrifice your life “to tame the proud, the fettered sea gull to free”?

The transition from a republican to an imperial ethic is fairly simple; it mainly requires constant repetition by both sides of the political class, and a readiness to blacken the name of anyone—Charles Lindbergh, Pat Buchanan—who dissents. Once its values have been assimilated by the public, its high-sounding call to self-sacrifice for someone else’s interests will prove almost irresistible to people to whom such an ethic had never occurred before. Of course, in addition to the propagandizing of the imperial ethic, the independent social institutions of the republic that sustain civic independence and activism must also be flattened. Independent businesses and farms must be consolidated into giant collectives or corporate organizations administered by managers; local government must be centralized and civic activism, discussion, and participation made impossible; a real and independent popular culture, in which the people produce their own culture, must be deracinated and shaped into what we now call “popular culture,” which is culture not produced by the people but what is produced for them by elites lodged in Hollywood, New York, Washington, and other imperial metropolises.

An independent popular culture is likely to go on churning out ideas, songs, books, poems, and symbols that are not sufficiently passive for an imperial system to rely upon. If you live under the ethic of civic independence, you know that if you don’t take care of your business, your farm, your family, your community, then no one else will; but in an empire, with an imperial ethic, there is always someone else who will take care of your business for you. That is precisely one of the great temptations of empire, as well as one of its great prices; and so the transition to empire involves not just a call to glory and self-sacrifice but also a social revolution by which the independent social institutions that sustain a self-governing people are replaced by institutions managed and controlled by the imperial elites.

This very process took place in the ancient Roman Republic, as the independent yeoman farmers of rural Italy entered the imperial armies and returned from the wars of conquest to find their farms swallowed by the giant plantations of absentee landlords in Rome, their families displaced to the city and dependent on the dole, and the whole social foundations of the Roman Republic transformed into a passive, dependent urban proletariat that was suited only for empire and its tin glories. And the same process takes place today in America and the Western nations, where transnational corporations swallow small businesses and farms and the social foundations of personal and civic independence are vanishing.

The domestic consequences of the transition to empire involve, then, not just the risk of foreign military adventures and the costs of administering an empire, but also a social and political revolution in which independence is replaced by dependence, local and personal autonomy is replaced by centralization, an ethic centered on community and
country is replaced by an imperial ethic centered on military glory and sacrifice for abstractions, and, in a word, self-government is replaced with rule by others, by a new ruling class dependent on empire and the state and giant institutions that manage it.

But there is yet another price of empire that must be paid, and that is the displacement of the native population. The great American historian of ancient Rome, Tenney Frank, in his *History of Rome*, commented on this consequence of Roman imperialism, comparing Rome as it had been near the beginning of its imperial period in the days of Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage, with Rome as it was at the end of the first century under the Emperor Domitian, a period of about 300 years.

In fact, old Rome is no more. If Scipio could have risen in Domitian’s day to see his native city, he would have found stately marble temples and palaces in the place of huts, but the features of the new Romans would have amazed him. The crowd of the Forum would have resembled the populace he once saw at Pergamum [in Asia Minor] and the senators would have differed little from the people on the streets. One has but to imagine the shade of Washington parading the Bowery.

Having conquered mankind and made the world obey, Rome found itself conquered—indeed, replaced—by the conquered. The replacement of the conquering people by those they conquer is almost an inevitable consequence of empire, and one that almost inevitably means the extinction of both the people and the civilization they have created. It is impossible for one nation or city-state or political unit to conquer and rule others without the people of the conquered states eventually entering into the lands of the conquerors. They come as slaves or cheap labor, as merchants, as mercenaries, and as refugees, and if their numbers are large enough they eventually replace the indigenous population. A contemporary apologist for imperialism, Professor Lewis Feuer, in his book *Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind*, virtually acknowledges this truth in his account of what he calls “progressive imperialism.”

A progressive imperialism like the Alexandrian or Roman was founded on a cosmopolitan view of man, a conception of human worth to be found among all men; it led to what we might characterize as a “participatory imperialism.” A Spaniard, a Gaul, or a Greek might, under the Roman Empire, if he possessed the necessary talent, rise to the highest grades of the military or civil service, or even become Emperor.

To Feuer, the value of imperialism is precisely that it breaks down the narrow-minded parochialism of the conquering people and their culture, as well as those of other peoples and other cultures, and mixes them all together in the “cosmopolitan view of man.” Yet, however glittering this universalist vision of empire may seem, Frank saw its consequences for the Romans clearly:
Even a hasty survey of the Republic is enough to show how the original peoples were wasted and scattered in migration and colonization, and how their places were filled chiefly by Eastern slaves….The assimilation of the foreign element was so rapid that the son of Marcus Aurelius [late 2nd century A.D.] seems to be the last emperor of Rome who could claim untainted descent from Italian parentage. That calm temper of the old state-builders, their love for law and order, their persistence in liberal and equitable dealings, in patient and untiring effort, their deliberation in reaching decisions, their distrust of emotions and intuitions, their unswerving devotion to liberty, their loyalty to tradition and to the state are the things one expects to find so long as the old Roman families are the dominant element in the Republic. By contrast the people of the Empire seem subservient and listless, caloric and unsteady, soft of fiber, weak of will, mentally fatigued, wont to abandon the guidance of reason for a crepuscular mysticism. The change is so marked that it is impossible to speak of the “spirit of Rome” or the “culture of Rome,” without defining whether the reference is to the Rome of 200 B.C. or of 200 A.D.

The parallel with the uncontrolled immigration now experienced by the United States is obvious enough, and even the Census Bureau tells us that by the middle of the next century, the majority of the American population will no longer be of European descent. It is not very likely that either the republican ideals of self-government or the other aspects of European civilization on which American civilization rests will survive this demographic revolution.

What this means is that the ultimate price of empire, its ultimate domestic consequence, is the death of the very people and civilization of the society that chooses or is gulled into following the path of empire. Not only the destruction of self-government and republican liberty, not only the absorption of independent institutions by organizations no longer under the control of those whose lives they regulate, not only the transference of loyalties and commitments to strange peoples and places with whom we have no connection, and not only perpetual war for perpetual peace are the prices of the imperial path but also the eventual extinction of the very people on whose backs and bones the empire was constructed. Perhaps the old Roman general Scipio himself, who if anyone can be called the founder of the Roman Empire, glimpsed this at the very moment when he stood before the ruins of Carthage; the historian Polybius, who was with Scipio at the time, writes:

At the sight of the city utterly perishing amidst the flames Scipio burst into tears, and stood long reflecting on the inevitable change which awaits cities, nations, and dynasties, one and all, as it does every one of us men. This, he thought, had befallen Ilium, once a powerful city, and the once
mighty empires of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and that of Macedonia lately so splendid.

Polybius also tells us that Scipio quoted lines from the *Iliad*: “The day shall come when holy Troy shall fall / And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam’s folk.”

Implicit in Rome’s victory over its enemy and the beginnings of its imperial sway was the destruction of Rome. For all the glitter and glory that empire seems to promise, that is the grim lesson history teaches us is its real price, and one that Americans would do well to weigh before they find that they and their children are the ones who will have to pay it.
Epilogue
Brian Mitchell

People are policy, as the saying goes in Washington. The point is that policy is entirely dependent upon the people appointed to execute it. A good political executive will pick his people to suit his policy. A bad one will pick his people for other reasons and trust them to pick the policy.

The easiest way to understand United States policy in the Balkans is to look at the policymakers, paying less attention to the rationale they themselves use to justify their policy than to their very personal perspectives. The truth is that the personal opinions of even very thoughtful and educated people are determined not so much by facts and logic as by attitudes and images, which people are more likely to inherit from their ancestors than to adopt on their own.

As a contributor to this timely volume has observed, in the last quarter-century, United States foreign policy has been entrusted to people lately arrived upon this continent, people indeed whose principal attachment to this country is a matter of ambition. They might just as well have settled elsewhere except that the United States offered better jobs, more prestige, and more power. In one egregious case, a man with dual Israeli and Australian citizenship, Martin Indyk, did not even accept U.S. citizenship until after he was offered a high-level job with Bill Clinton’s National Security Council. (He is now Clinton’s ambassador to Israel.)

It is supposedly a great honor to rule the world, and those who urge this honor upon us no doubt think themselves patriotic for doing so. It is not in our personal or national interest, but it appeals to our personal and national pride, and it agrees with some very American ways of thinking about the world.

Americans have long seen themselves as the beacon of freedom showing the rest of the world the right way to live, and more than once they have gone to war to force the issue. Indeed, of all of the wars fought by the United States as a sovereign state, only the War of 1812 was solely defensive in purpose. All the rest were crusades — wars we were not forced to fight but entered freely with the high moral purpose of expanding the right rule of democracy to new lands.¹

In most of its wars, the United States deliberately provoked hostilities, always with weaker nations that would have preferred not to fight us. Polk drew the line at the Rio Grande and dared the Mexicans to cross it. Lincoln fortified Fort Sumter to invite attack. McKinley made an issue of the mysterious explosion of the battleship Maine.

¹ I grant that the Indian Wars were both defensive and expansionistic.
What was it doing in Havana anyway?) Wilson was supplying arms to Britain and France, even while pretending to keep the country out of the war. Roosevelt refused to negotiate with the Japanese after delivering an ultimatum he knew they would not accept. Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin incident as an excuse for escalation. Bush organized the war against Iraq. (To my knowledge, Korea was the only war the United States did not contrive to start, but I might be wrong.)

Each of these wars was justified in grand moral terms. The Mexican and Spanish-American Wars were fought against corrupt, oppressive imperial rulers. The Civil War was the war to end slavery and save the sacred Union. World War I was “the war to end all wars,” “the war to make the world safe for Democracy,” even “America’s War for Humanity” (the title of a book published in 1919). World War II was “the good war” against fascism. Korea and Vietnam were wars to stop the spread of Communism. The Gulf War was waged against the evil aggressor Saddam Hussein.

The odd thing is that with the exception of the first two mentioned, for which the real motive was land-grabbing, high-blown moral sentiments really were the reason for going to war, not just a cynical cover for national self-interest. In every other instance, America went to war without any expectation of gain from victory except the satisfaction of having done the right thing. In every other war, the United States put a handful of very American principles — freedom, democracy, and equality for others — ahead of the lives, liberty, property, and happiness of its own people.

The fondness of Americans for moral crusades is not limited to armed conflict. It is a common phenomenon of our domestic politics as well, witness the various movements that have imposed their will in high dudgeon upon an otherwise complacent nation: abolition, temperance, suffrage, civil rights, feminism, environmentalism, gay rights, etc. The attitude behind each of these movements is that there is a right way to live and, dammit, everyone ought to live that way.

Ideas about the right way to live have changed over time, but the attitude is still very much with us. We Americans are, as one historian has put it, “perfectionist utopians.” We really do earnestly aim to set things right in this world, and that’s why many immigrants come here. They like our insistence on doing the right thing, especially because the right thing for the last century-and-a-half has meant ignoring differences of religion and ethnicity. For many newcomers, that’s what it means to be American. Many Americans will not dispute this belief, but many also would. In fact, many always have. Here also we must look for the people responsible for the policy.

Even before the first wave of non-English immigration, the American people were not the homogeneous settlers and patriots that most Americans themselves imagine. In his

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2 In between wars, the United States invaded Russia, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and now Bosnia.
bestseller *Albion’s Seed*, perhaps the greatest book of American self-knowledge ever written, historian David Hackett Fischer identifies four foundational American ethnic groups originating in the British Isles. These four peoples differed greatly in the way their lived and in their reasons for settling in America. They may have united for a time behind trendy symbols like *liberty*, *democracy*, and *equality*, but they assigned such symbols to different meanings. Their differences are with us today and are the root of many of our present problems.

The “perfectionist utopians” represent only one strain of Americanism, a strain originating in the New England colonies, settled largely by Puritans from East Anglia, the counties north of London and south of the Wash. They came to this continent, as Samuel Francis is fond of saying, fleeing religious tolerance — to escape not persecution but the immorality they imagined around them. In the New World, they hoped to build a New Jerusalem of like-minded true-believers, based on the tight-knit, well-ordered towns they had know in their homeland.

In their early years, they staged many minor crusades against heretics and witches. Later they were the chief instigators of the rebellion against their own king, responsible for firing the first shot heard round the world. The abolition of slavery was their next great cause, and once the killing had begun, they took to it heartily, as a holy war they were sure to win. Glory, glory, hallelujah! Only after the Civil War did the New England strain of Americanism come to dominate the American national character, suppressing but not replacing the other strains. It eventually lost its original religious basis, but not its aggressively moralistic attitude.

Two other strains were the Quakers from England’s North Midlands, who settled the Delaware valley, and the planters or cavaliers from England’s West Country, who settled the tidewater South. The Quakers faded from power during the French and Indian War, when many refused fight. The cavaliers lost out to the Yankees in the Civil War. Neither disappeared entirely, and many Americans today can count themselves as descendents of these distinctive cultures, but they would never again possess the power they once had.

A fourth strain, according to Fischer, is descended from the bellicose “North Britons,” more commonly called the Scotch-Irish. Rude folk from the borders of England and Scotland, they gloriied in war and were none too particular about their excuses for it. In America, they settled the back country and rose to national prominence with the ascendancy of Andrew Jackson. Through two centuries, they provided much of the pugnacious spirit for America’s wars, both foreign and domestic. Time and time again the Scotch-Irish joined forces with the New England utopians to lead the nation to war. Every single war freely joined by the United States can be laid at the feet of a president who was the product of either one or both of these cultures. Lincoln, Bush, and Franklin Roosevelt were New England Yankees. Kennedy was Irish with a Yankee upbringing.
Grant, McKinley, and Teddy Roosevelt were Scotch-Irish with a Yankee upbringing. Polk, Wilson, and Lyndon Johnson were Scotch-Irish only. It is a deadly combination: self-righteous New England indignation and prideful Scotch-Irish belligerence. When aroused together, they will stop at nothing - neither violence nor tyranny - before making every neck and knee bend. With the late addition of a third factor, a Jewish preoccupation with foreign affairs, we have a prescription for benevolent global disaster, well-intended but arrogant, ignorant, hubristic, and ultimately ruinous.

Its chief fault is its presumption of God-like wisdom in being able to know just who is right in every squabble and just what must be done to set matters straight. The New England abolitionists knew that slavery was evil, but was it more evil than the slaughter of 600,000 men, including 37,000 blacks? In the minds of many Northern warriors, yes. Their cause was just, and therefore the lives lost were a sacrifice, a holocaust, pleasing to God. Likewise, Madeline Albright knows that Saddam Hussein is evil and therefore the death of 500,000 Iraqi children, starved by sanctions, is “a very hard choice, but the price, we think the price is worth it.” [60 Minutes, May 12, 1996]

How easily we killed them. . . . We did not kill them with prior intent. We killed them because it was not important to us not to kill them. . . . We killed them out of a certain naïve hubris. Believing with absolute certitude that now, with the White House, the Senate and much of the American media in our hands, the lives of others do not count as much as our own. [Ari Shavit, “How Easily We Killed Them,” New York Times, May 27, 1996]

The words belong to an Israeli journalist decrying the shelling of a United Nations compound in Lebanon. They apply to our own use of deadly force against a people we have identified as evil and therefore unworthy of life, believing that all power is in our hands, given to us by God to do his service.

We suffer from twin faults leading in the same murderous direction. The first is a gnostic belief in our own anointing as a nation, a belief without any foundation in scripture or tradition, chosen merely because it flatters us. Where in the Holy Writ does it mention America’s role in the redemption of the world? Yet many American Christians speak piously of a God-favored nation that has become the light unto the gentiles.

The second is an undeserved confidence in our ability to know and reason, which makes it easy for us to pass judgment on others and bear the sword against them, accounting ourselves blameless for the destruction we cause. This is a common fault of bookish, intellectual Christians who wish always to have an answer to life’s moral dilemmas. War is a moral dilemma that such Christians attempt to resolve by reasoning whether the war is just or unjust. Their rationales vary, as do their results, but the manner in which they approach the problem is the same: a lot of guesses, based upon limited knowledge and arbitrary estimations of unquantifiable values, cranked into a formula that
produces a simple, pseudo-certain answer. We all know how well men rationalize their nonrational preferences, yet after doing our just-war calculations and obtaining an answer in favor of war, we then proceed with a clear conscience to commit ghastly acts.

Certainly some wars must be fought, but we are best able to know which wars should be fought when they touch us personally. Reality is always more complicated than we imagine, and the farther the reality is from our own experience the less we can understand it. This is the moral basis for nonintervention, for staying out of other peoples’ problems because we do not know well what to do about them. Even in moral matters, our ability to discern right and wrong is limited, and many times we must choose our course without full confidence that our choices are correct and with nothing else to say for ourselves than “Lord have mercy!”

Epistemological humility, a recognition of the limits of man’s ability to know, is found at the very root of the Christian conservative tradition. Epistemological hubris is in the heart of every utopian tyrant who wants to make the world obey. God knows; man only thinks he knows, and actually knows far less than he thinks. When he thinks he can play god, he does abominable things.

During the Gulf War, there was some public discussion among religious intellectuals of whether war with Iraq was justified, with the consensus being that it was. Before and after our intervention in Bosnia, there was no such discussion. Based on images and allegations relayed by television, Americans decided that the Bosnian Serbs were evil and deserved to die. The proof served to them by our rulers seemed plain enough: a shot of an emaciated man with a caption identifying him as an imprisoned Muslim; a video of an explosion at a market place; mourners running for cover from sniper fire at a little girl’s funeral and a voice-over blaming the Serbs; the daily mortar-fire and sniping in Sarajevo presumed to have come from Serb positions outside the city. All of these images were later found to be false, but not before the Serbs — our Christian brethren, our erstwhile allies — had been condemned.

It is not for us mere mortals to judge the earth. Christ will judge and God will punish. Our benevolent global intentions shall not save us. The road to hell may be paved with them.
Contributors

Dr. Thomas Fleming is the president of The Rockford Institute and the editor of *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture*.

Dr. Samuel Francis is the editor of the *Samuel Francis Letter*, a nationally syndicated columnist, and a contributing editor to *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture*.

Professor Yelena Gusskova is a professor at the Moscow State University and director of the Center for the Study of Modern Balkan Conflict at the Russian Academy of Science.

Mr. James Jatras is a policy analyst at the U.S. Senate. The views expressed are his own and do not represent any Senate office or member.tical consultant with the U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee.

Mr. Scott P. Richert is the assistant editor of *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture*, a publication of The Rockford Institute.

Sir Alfred Sherman is a writer, journalist, political consultant, and chairman of The Lord Byron Foundation.

Mr. Joe Sobran is the editor of *Sobran’s Newsletter* and a syndicated columnist.

Dr. Michael Stenton teaches modern history for the Board of Continuing Education at the University of Cambridge and is on the board of The Lord Byron Foundation.

Dr. Raju G.C. Thomas is a professor of political science and director of the Center for International Studies at Marquette University, Milwaukee.

Dr. Srdja Trifkovic is the executive director of The Lord Byron Foundation, a member of the faculty of Rose Hill College in Aiken, South Carolina, and a frequent contributor to *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture*.

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